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I. Introduction: 
The issue of ioterspecies ethics has been io existence, io one form or another, at 
least sioce the era of ancient Greek philosophy and io all probability long before it. 
Occasionally, over the intervening centuries, some progressive thinker would revive the 
issue anew by offering new or recycled thoughts on the matter. Aristotle (Aristotle 1905), 
Aquinas (Aquinas 1923), Descartes (Descartes 1978), Voltaire (Voltaire 1971), Kant 
(Kant 1963), Bentham (Bentham 1948), Schweitzer (Schweitzer 1961), and Salt (Salt 
1980) are some of the more renowned examples. 
The question of the ethical treatment of animals can be viewed as two separate but 
related issues, animal welfare and animal rights. The modem animal rights movement was 
born with the release of Animal Liberation by the Australian philosopher Peter Singer in 
1975 (Harnack 1996, 16). This seminal work has come to be known as the "bible" of the 
animal rights movement (Harnack 1996, 16). It has had a significant impact on our society 
and touched off an intense debate (Harnack 1996, 12). One would be hard-pressed to find 
anyone that has not heard of or been affected by the animal rights movement. A plethora 
of animal rights organizations have been formed (Fraser et al. 1990, 1 06). Some, like 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, advocate animal rights with an almost 
religious zeal, picketing businesses that "exploit" animals, staging public events calculated 
to shock the public ioto awareness of animal rights issues, and other protest activities 
designed to keep animal rights on the public agenda (PET A 1997). Others like The 
Humane Society of the United States advocate a more moderate approach (HSUS 1997). 
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A few of these organizations, like the Animal Liberation Front, advocate the total 
abolition of animal 'exploitation' by whatever means necessary including civil 
disobedience and criminal behavior (Harnack 1996, 16). Animal users and consumers of 
every description from hunters to pet owners, zoos to circuses, furriers to livestock 
producers, and conservationists to researchers have been put on the defensive by the 
aggressive tactics of animal rights advocacy organizations. 
The issues of animal welfare and rights have particular relevance for natural 
resource managers. Park managers often encounter conditions where the homeostasis of a 
park ecosystem has been compromised by the absence of the primary, indigenous 
predators. This situation often leads to the over-population of various herbivorous species 
that further degrades the habitat due to overgrazing. A typical case involves deer 
populations that, in the absence of natural population controls such as wolves, increase 
beyond the carrying capacity of the ecosystem. Park managers are faced with artificially 
controlling the populations of these herbivores. This is ususally accomplished by culling 
the herd (The Columbus Dispatch, 25 May 1997). This situation typically leads to a 
challenge from animal rights activists. Unfortunately, these challenges are often 
mishandled because, in the author's opinion, natural resource personnel are inadequately 
prepared to address the challenge. The deer culling in the Sharon Woods Metro Park 
some years ago is an example. 
After twenty years of debate, it appears that the issue has become deadlocked with 
little possibility of consensus for the foreseeable future. The primary participants have 
hardened their positions from arguments based on reason to rhetoric based on dogma. 
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New opinions are added to the debate, however, they are typically variations of the 
principal arguments. The tension between the opposing groups is exacerbated by the fact 
that issues concerning animals often generate powerful emotions. The public is caught 
between opposing forces with little hope of making a reasoned decision. 
Animal utilization lies at the very core of human culture. Animals are used for 
food, clothing, entertainment, companionship, labor, surrogates for biomedical research, 
and so on. If it were possible to develop an irrefutable argument in support of animal 
rights, the socio-cultural impacts would be potentially enormous. The stakes are obviously 
high and with the competing antagonists locked in dogma, the debate has become mired in 
the politics of confrontation and conflict. 
Although there are many arguments offered on the subject, there are only a limited 
number of ways of approaching the issue. On one end of the spectrum are those who 
assert that no other life-form but human is entitled to moral consideration of any kind. 
This extreme position would view any treatment of nonhuman organisms with total 
indifference. Any treatment no matter how seemingly cruel or insensitive would be morally 
irrelevant. Rene Descartes offered an argument representative of this view. His criterion 
for moral standing consisted of having a rational soul. He asserted that no living thing but 
man met this criterion. He asserted that animals were senseless machines--automatons. 
This argument gave comfort and license to vivesectionists who dissected living animals 
without any anesthetic since they felt no pain. This position is no longer considered 
credible or relevant to the issue at hand. 
On the other end of the spectrum is the extreme position of equal rights for all 
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living organisms. Albert Schweitzer's reverence for life comes closest to this position, but 
even he recognized that as heterotrophic organisms, our nature requires that we take life 
to survive. Although he maintained that each of us must bear individual moral 
responsibility for the injury and death we cause, he still viewed it as a necessary evil. From 
a practical perspective, this extreme position is, like its opposite, not relevant to the 
current debate. 
In practical terms, the viewpoints on animal rights can be roughly divided into two 
groups. Since virtually no one publicly espouses a position of total indifference to the 
treatment of all nonhuman organisms such as Descartes', it becomes a question of animal 
welfare, that is what nonhumans are moral patients. Moral patients are those who are 
capable of being owed moral consideration but not moral agency. On the other side, it is a 
question of animal rights, in other words, what nonhumans are moral agents. Moral agents 
are those individuals that are capable of having moral obligations as well as generating 
moral obligations in other moral agents. 
In this thesis, I will present representative arguments from the animal welfare and 
animal rights perspectives on the moral standing of animals, and I will discuss a biocentric 
approach to the issue. This thesis is divided into two sections: "Animal Rights: The 
Dominant Viewpoints" and "Animal Rights: A Biocentric Perspective." All arguments are 
presented in four parts: 1) a presentation of the principal tenets of the argument, 2) the 
typical objections to the argument, 3) a discussion of the argument and the objections, and 
4) the conclusion. 
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D. Literature Review: 
The literature addressing animal rights is extensive. Since the publication of 
Animal Liberation in 1975, numerous books and articles have been published. The 
National Agricultural Library (NAL) of the United States Department of Agriculture has 
compiled a bibliography entitled Ethical and Moral Issues Relating to Animals containing 
349 citations from January 1985 to February 1992 (NAL 1992). Fortunately, there are 
several excellent anthologies on the subject that distill the many differing viewpoints down 
to the fundamental arguments that form the essence of the debate. Since the essential 
arguments for and against animal rights are relatively few in number, the literature search 
can be easily managed. 
m. Methodology: 
The issue of animal rights is essentially one of ethics or morality. Ethical or moral 
systems usually derive from worldviews such as those based on religions, science, or 
culture and are considered in disciplines or fields such as theology, anthropology and 
cosmology. For the purposes of this thesis, the approach to animal rights will be limited to 
moral philosophy. Therefore, the methods employed to achieve the goals of this paper are 
the dialectical methods of philosophy and include deductive and inductive arguments, 
example and counterexample, and so forth. At the heart of the animal rights issue is the 
question of moral standing or considerability; who or what has it and why. There are two 
types of moral standing. Moral agents are beings who are capable of having obligations 
and moral patients (subjects) are beings who are capable ofbeing owed obligations. The 
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primary issue in dispute in the animal rights debate focuses on what constitutes acceptable 
criteria for recognition as either a moral agent or patient. Animal rights advocates argue 
for criteria that would extend moral agency beyond just humans to at least some animals 
that would then have equal rights with all other moral agents including humans. Animal 
rights opponents argue for criteria that restrict moral agency to rational, self-legislative, 
members of a moral community. Animal welfarists argue for criteria according to which at 
least some animals would be moral subjects to which humans as moral agents would have 
obligations. 
Some general information may provide further insight into the methodology used 
in this analysis. Normative ethical theories (NETs) are philosophical tools that provide 
guidelines for developing strategies to arrive at specific moral judgments (Rosen 1990, 
14). A NET consists of a theory of value and a theory of obligation. The theory of value 
defines what is valued, thereby, providing a reference system for justifYing moral 
judgments. A theory of obligation defines what actions are permitted or prohibited. 
Teleological theories are based on the value of the consequences of actions and their 
associated probabilities, while deontological theories of obligation are based on the value 
of actions regardless of the consequences (Bowie et al. 1992, 4). The term "rights" in 
"animal rights" refers to the type of"rights" that generate obligations for moral agents, in 
other words, those beings capable of comprehending and behaving in accord with moral 
principles and judgments; "ought" implies "can". If an organism is recognized by moral 
agents as having a "right to life", then they have an obligation not to kill the organism. If 
an organism has a right to be free of suffering, then moral agents have obligations to 
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prevent or not to inflict suffering on the organism. As moral agents, humans have moral 
obligations. Humans who, for various reasons such as mental retardation, are not capable 
of moral agency are in most human societies considered moral subjects, that is, they 
generate obligations in moral agents but have none themselves. The criteria by which 
moral standing is determined is at the heart of the animal rights debate. 
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PART ONE 
Animal Rights: The Dominant Viewpoints. 
Peter Siager:. Equal eoasideratioa for animals. 
Peter Singer is a philosopher who views the issue of human treatment of 
nonhuman animals as a matter of welfare, not rights. He offers what is perhaps the best 
known animal rights argument and undoubtedly the most influential. 
Premise 1. If any action increases the overall good of the greatest number 
more than any other available action, then that action is obligatory. 
Premise 2. The act of preventing or minimizing suffering increases the good of the 
greatest number more than any other available action. 
Conclusion: This particular action is obligatory. 
Singer derives his perspective from the fundamental, moral principle of equal 
consideration of interests. The principle of equality is the assertion that "Each [is] to count 
for one and none for more than one" (Singer 1990, 5). This principle "is not a description 
of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat 
human beings" (Harnack 1996, 21 ). Anything which has morally significant interests falls 
within the purview of the principle of equal consideration. Singer argues that "only a being 
with subjective experiences ... can have interests in the full sense of the term" (Bowie et al. 
1992, 481). In another work, he states that, "the capacity for suffering or enjoying things 
(sentience) is a prerequisite for having interests at all" (Regan and Singer 1989, 78). 
Therefore, in Singer's view, not just humans but all sentient beings are entitled to equal 
consideration. Accordingly, to discriminate against other species by giving greater weight 
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to our own is analogous to racism and sexism which also discriminate by giving greater 
weight to a favored group. Furthermore, Singer asserts that if we judge racism and sexism 
to be immoral, then consistency demands the same judgment for speciesism (Bowie et at. 
1992, 480). 
If not all species are sentient, then the question arises of where we draw the line 
between those species that are entitled to equal consideration of interests and those that 
are not. Singer acknowledges that he could not clearly determine where to draw the line of 
sentience or interests in the phylogenetic spectrum of species. In the original edition of his 
Animal Liberation (1975) he suggested ''that somewhere between a shrimp and an oyster 
seems as good a place to draw the line as any." In the 1990 edition of his book, Singer 
admits to doubts about his earlier positioning of the line of sentience and then includes all 
mollusks in the portion of the phylogenetic spectrum that can be said to have interests. 
He recognizes that the concept of "interests" may be open to question or 
interpretation, so he tries to clarify his position. He points out that it could be argued that 
a tree has interests, for example, in being watered. This, he contends, is too loose an 
interpretation of"interests" and "is not the sense covered by the principle of equal 
consideration of interests" (Bowie et at. 1992, 481 ). The statement that the tree has an 
interest in being watered really amounts to saying that the tree needs water to survive, and 
this is the same as saying that a car needs oil to continue to function properly. In neither 
case do we believe that there is a conscious preference for water or oil. Singer asserts that 
consciousness is a necessary and sufficient condition for having interests: "only a being 
with subjective experiences ... can have interests in the full sense of the term" (Bowie et al. 
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1992, 481 ). Singer's view of animal rights necessarily limits moral considerability to 
individual, sentient organisms and, therefore, when weighing the relative interests of 
individual organisms in a conflict of interest situation, no additional weight can be given to 
one organism over the other because of the rarity of its species. In other words, if 
domestic goats were introduced into an island ecosystem where they were eating to 
extirpation a particular species of plant that was the only food source for an endangered 
species of indigenous animal, the goats would have equal moral standing with the 
endangered species. The only valid basis for variable weight of moral considerability in 
situations of conflicts of interests is the relative degree of suffering between the involved 
individuals. 
Objections: 
1.) R. G. Frey argues that animals cannot have interests. He defines interests in the 
"sense of having wants which can be satisfied or left unsatisfied" (Regan and Singer 1989, 
39). Frey uses the term ~'wants" to include both needs and desires. Animals need water 
just as tractors need oil in order to remain "a good of their kind" (Regan and Singer 1989, 
40). Since tractors, plants and animals all have needs this cannot be the sense of want that 
equates with interests because nothing is excluded "from the class of want-holders" 
(Regan and Singer 1989, 39). As for the other form of wants, Frey argues that animals can 
not have desires. 
According to Frey, to desire something one has to be capable of beliefs and 
"having beliefs is not compatible with the absence of language and linguistic ability" 
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(Regan and Singer 1989, 40). In other words, Frey maintains that belief is predicated on 
language. He offers an example to demonstrate his point. He imagines himself a collector 
of rare books who desires to own a Gutenberg Bible. He asserts that his desire derives 
from his belief that he does not own such a book and as a result his coUection is deficient. 
His desire is dependent on his belief: and what he believes is that the statement "My 
coUection lacks a Gutenberg Bible" is true (Regan and Singer 1989, 40). For a bird in a 
cage to desire to be free, according to Frey, it must believe that a sentence declaring that it 
has a particular deficiency, say freedom of movement, for example, is true, is to generate a 
desire for what is lacking-freedom. "If what is believed is that a certain declarative 
sentence is true, then no creature which lacks language can have desires" (Regan and 
Singer 1989, 41 ). Some human animals such as the severely mentaUy retarded and all 
nonhuman animals do not possess language capability, therefore, they cannot have desires. 
Without desire there are no interests. Furthermore, to even have a concept of 
belief, there must be the ability to distinguish between true and false beliefs. He gives the 
example of a statement that "the cat believes the door is locked" which to him means that 
the cat believes that the declarative sentence "the door is locked" is true and that, 
therefore, the declarative sentence that "the door is unlocked" is false. Since it is well 
known that cats, all other nonhuman animals, and some human animals lack the ability to 
distinguish true from false beliefs, they cannot have a concept of belief: so they cannot 
have interests. He offers several other arguments regarding language and awareness to 
support his claim that what is believed is that a particular declarative sentence is true. 
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2.) Regan argues that, just as utilitarianism has serious flaws as a normative ethical 
theory of anthropocentric morality, Singer's utilitarian based approach to interspecies 
ethics is also seriously flawed. Regan bases his case not on the moral principle of equality 
of interests that is the foundation of Singer's position, but on the other fundamental 
principle of utilitarianism, the principle of utility. Anything which has utility is useful or 
beneficial and, therefore, has value. Regan points out that, according to the utilitarian 
theory of value, utilitarians value only the "satisfaction of an individual's interests, not the 
individual whose interests they are" (Regan and Singer (1989, 109). Consequently, living 
beings have no value as individuals, only their feelings do. Consequently, they cannot 
have rights in the conventional sense. 
The principle of utility, the fundamental principle of utilitarianism, is a theory of 
obligation according to which moral agents have an obligation to perform "the act that will 
bring about the best balance between satisfaction and frustration for everyone affected by 
the outcome" (Regan and Singer 1989, 108). This leads to some serious problems for 
utilitarianism in general as well as for Singer's animal welfare position. Since utilitarianism 
is an aggregative, teleological theory, a utilitarian, in deciding what action is morally 
obligatory, must identify all the sentient beings affected by the action, determine how they 
will be affected, sum up all the pleasures and pains of every being affected for every 
available action, and then must perform the action that will bring about the best balance 
between satisfaction and frustration for everyone affected by the outcome. Regan then 
gives an example of the type usually used to point out the inherent difficulties with 
utilitarianism. He imagines that he has an old, cranky and very rich aunt. She is in good 
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health and prefers to go on living. He knows that she has willed her fortune to him upon 
her death. As a utilitarian evaluating his moral obligations to her, he observes that he has a 
number of alternate actions that he could take regarding her. He could take no action 
whatever, in which case the money would still be his but perhaps many years later. He 
could be a kind understanding and supportive nephew, or he could kill her by some means 
guaranteed not to be detected and get the money right away. In order to avoid a huge tax 
on his inheritance, he would donate a large portion of it to a local children's hospital. If he 
totals up all the benefit to the children and himself and weighs it against the pain inflicted 
in murdering his aunt, the benefits to the many children and himself far outweigh the loss 
to his aunt and the few, if any, who would mourn her loss. Therefore, according to 
utilitarian moral theory, he is morally obligated to kill his aunt. This kind of argument 
against utilitarianism can be applied to a wide variety of situations including ones that 
involve nonhuman animals, thereby, threatening the very beings that Singer seeks to 
protect. 
3.) Carl Cohen argues against Singer's position in inflammatory terms. He argues that 
Singer's analogy between racism and speciesism is "atrocious," "offensive," and "utterly 
specious" (Cohen 1986, 867). He asserts that Singer made an error in his analogy based 
on moral equality. Racism and sexism are clearly morally wrong because there is no 
morally relevant distinction among the races or between the sexes. On the other hand, the 
morally relevant differences between humans and animals are enormous. Cohen states that 
he is a speciesist, and that speciesism is "essential for right conduct" (Cohen 1986, 867). 
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"Every sensitive moral judgment requires that the differing natures of the beings to whom 
obligations are owed be considered" (Cohen 1986, 867). 
Discussion: 
1.) Frey attempts to undermine Singer's animal welfare position by arguing that 
animals cannot have interests. Singer bases his whole case on the utilitarian principle of 
equal consideration of interests. If Frey can successfully argue that animals cannot have 
interests, then Singer's position is refuted. Frey, however, bases his argument on a 
different understanding of interests than Singer uses. Singer defines interests as the 
capacity for experiencing pleasure and pain. Frey does not acknowledge this definition let 
alone challenge it. Instead, he defines interests as wants or desires and proceeds to argue 
why it is that all nonhuman animals and some dysfunctional humans cannot have interests. 
In my opinion, his argument does not refute Singer's assertion. Perhaps he is trying to 
suggest that a sentient animal such as a cat cannot have interests even in Singer's context 
because it cannot desire not to suffer since it lacks the ability to believe that the declarative 
sentence "I lack pleasure" is a true statement. As Frey asserts in his argument, since it 
cannot have the concept of belief, it cannot desire pleasure. There must be more to desire 
than belief; I believe that I lack an elephant, but I do not desire one. Therefore, since it 
cannot desire, it cannot have interests. Frankly, I am surprised that anyone would seriously 
suggest that language, or any cognitive ability is required by a being to experience 
suffering. The instinctive subconscious drive to survive is more than adequate to explain 
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the need or desire to avoid pain or suffering. Frey's argument fails to refute Singer's 
position, and it is doubtful that it supports his own. 
I don't think refuting Frey's argument contributes to the purpose of this paper, 
however, if one were to try, he or she could find several weak points in Frey's premises. 
For example, I share my home with an umbrella cockatoo named Jenna. She spends most 
of her time in a cage which apparently restricts her movements to such an unnatural 
degree that the lack of freedom triggers in her the want or desire or subconscious drive to 
get out. When she was first moved into her cage, her behavior suggested that she was 
looking for a way out. It was only a matter of days before she learned by trial and error or 
discovered serendipitously that she could unlatch the door and let herself out. She 
proceeded to demonstrate that this was not the result of a fortuitous accident by 
repeatedly opening the door and leaving her cage. This state of affairs caused a great deal 
of stress to the other inhabitants of our home, so it was necessary to "lock her door" with 
a spring loaded clasp. The moment that I approached her cage with the unfamiliar device 
Jenna focused on it and everything I did with it. Jenna began investigating the new device 
immediately and within several days had successfully learned the necessary manipulations 
to release the clasp. The cage is now locked with a screw type device that she is so far 
unable to open. Did she give up and accept the situation? No, within days she had learned 
or discovered (is there a difference?) that if she shoved the bottom tray of the cage 
completely out until it fell to the floor, she could exit her cage through the opening. The 
tray is now locked in place. 
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First let me state that I am aware of the danger of anthropomorphizing Jenna' s 
behavior. I am certainly not suggesting that Jenna is a fully rational being. I am stating that 
I observed her behavior as she closely observed my behavior. I don't think Jenna 
consciously believed that the declarative statement "the door to my prison is locked" was 
true, but she clearly associated the clasp with her inability to open the door that she could 
open with ease before its appearance. She wanted, desired, or was driven by subconscious 
impulse to get out and acted on it by opening the clasp so that she could open the door. 
Her behavior at least clearly indicates a strong and persistent drive to be free. According 
to Frey's argument, either she holds the declarative statements "I lack freedom", "the door 
is closed", and ''the clasp device locks the door" to be true or Frey's argument fails. 
2.) Regan's objection is well taken. It is the type of argument that is usually offered to 
demonstrate the inherent weaknesses in utilitarian normative ethical theory. Utilitarians 
have and continue to offer arguments to counter the objections to their theory, however, 
to my knowledge, none have succeeded (Smart and Williams 1973). 
3.) Cohen's objections seem to be confused in the sense that he argues against animal 
rights, which is Regan's position, as though it were Singer's position. He argues for moral 
standing for some animals, which is essentially Singer's position, although he qualifies it 
by asserting that the differing natures of organisms to which we owe obligations must be 
considered. This sounds similar to Rachels' moral individualism theory and seems 
reasonable. However, Cohen's assertion that the morally relevant differences between 
humans and animals are enormous, which is essential to his argument, is very problematic. 
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For many species that is probably true, however, for others such as the more complex 
mammals like primates, it is clearly doubtful. 
4.) I think it is interesting to note that Singer in his Animal Liberation never mentions 
the utilitarian principle of utility. More importantly, after pointing out that his position has 
nothing to do with animal rights but rather animal welfare, he states that the use of the 
term "rights" is, just as Jeremy Bentham, the founding father of modern utilitarianism, 
referred to it, a "shorthand way of referring to protections that people and animals morally 
ought to have." He goes on to add that, "It is even more valuable in the era of thirty-
second TV news clips ... " (Singer 1990, 8). In other words, it is an expedient opportunity 
that is exploited to generate more sympathy for his political cause, animal liberation. Some 
would question the morality of such a strategy. 
5.) The characteristic of sentience as the defining characteristic for moral standing is 
vague in application and results in arbitrary judgments. It is easy for humans to define pain 
and pleasure in human terms, however, as one moves across the phylogenetic spectrum of 
species from humans on one end toward the increasingly less complex species on the other 
end, the definition becomes increasingly unclear. 
Singer offers two indicators of the capacity to suffer~ behavior and similarity of the 
organism's nervous system to that of humans (Armstrong and Dotzler 1993, 333). He 
makes the point that plants do not have nervous systems and they don't behave in ways 
that suggest pain, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that they are not capable of 
experiencing pain or suffering. This position is consistent with a form of physicalism or 
behaviorism, it is not clear which. Physicalists assert that the mental event of pain is a 
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physical neurological event. Behaviorists assert that the mental event of pain is a kind of 
behavioral event. Behaviorism was a prominent scientific and philosophical doctrine that 
"has lost the sweeping influence it once enjoyed" (Kim 1996, 26). In 1967 Hilary Putnam 
published "Psychological Predicates." According to Kim, "This paper ... quickly brought 
about the demise of type physicalism, in particular the mind~brain identity theory, as the 
reigning theory of mind ... " (Kim 1996, 73). It also gave birth to the new doctrine of 
functionalism which has arguably become the dominant theory of mind. 
If we consider the question of what it is that all pains have in common that makes 
them a single mental kind, the physicalist will respond that it is a physical kind like C·fiber 
activation (a neuronal response) and the behaviorist will say that it is a behavioral kind like 
a wince. The functionalist, however, will say that it is neither of these, but rather a "causal 
functional kind" (Kim 1996, 76). According to functionalism, pain is a functional concept 
that has a specific causal role. The importance of this function cannot be overstated. 
Tissue damage threatens the continued survival of an organism, so any physiological 
mechanism that functioned as a tissu~damage detector would be 'selected for' by the 
evolutionary process of natural selection. Organisms existing in different environments 
would evolve different ''tissu~damage detectors" that were consistent with their specific 
physiology (Kim 1996, 75). The functional concept of mental events has the important 
affect of freeing mental events from specific physical mechanisms. In other words, nerves 
and brains are not necessary to experience the functional analogue of pain. In one kind of 
organism the tissuHamage detector might be a neurological mechanism and in another it 
might be a physico.chemical mechanism. Plants may not have nervous systems, but they 
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do have physico-chemical, tissue-damage detectors that trigger a wide variety of responses 
including instantaneous withdrawal from contact, moving limbs from sources of stress by 
differential hydraulic pressures, and elaborate defense mechanisms to protect their 
interests (Campbell 1993, 768). Tfthe criterion for moral considerabiJity is the capacity to 
feel pain or suffer as Singer argues, then from a functionalist perspective, it could be 
argued that all life forms that have a functional analogue of pain or a tissue-damage 
detector mechanism ought to have moral standing. Therefore, a functionalist might define 
sentience biological1y rather than behaviorally or physiologically. Of course, it could be 
objected that such a position is not practical because, if we were morally obligated to 
consider the interests of all beings that are sentient in a functionalist context, nearly all, if 
not a11, life forms would be sentient and how would we, as heteroptrophic organisms, 
survive if we, in consideration of their interests, could not use them? This is a reasonable 
question, and T will argue in Part TT that perhaps one answer can be found in the distinction 
between interspecies and intraspecies ethics. 
We assume none of these responses are conscious, but, as Singer points out, 
consciousness is not a prerequisite for suffering or pain and, furthermore, we do not 
understand what consciousness is even in humans. Tt may be that consciousness and 
behavior are both continua beginning as a most rudimentary state of awareness and 
mechanical response and increasing aggregatively across the phylogenetic spectrum to the 
self-conscious and volitional human species. Tfthis were the case, the capacity for 
suffering would also be a continuum extending from the least amount of suffering that 
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could be characterized as biomechanica1 stress to the maximum amount of stress as 
currently expressed by the human species. 
6.) Another concern is that only one species is deciding what characteristics are 
necessary for moral standing for the entire phylogenetic spectrum of species. This raises 
many questions about moral agency, the objectivity of evaluations of moral standing of 
other species, whether moral agency entails that moral agents may define the moral status 
of other beings, and so on. Some might argue that humans, as the only species capable of 
moral agency, are justified in defining the limits of moral obligations, if any, to other 
species. I submit that we cannot yet claim to be the only moral agent on this planet. 
Several other social species have relatively complex codes of behavior that may include at 
least a rudimentary from of moral agency. Furthermore, it is impossible for humans to 
completely remove their anthropocentric glasses to objectively evaluate what 
characteristics should count for moral standing. Obviously it is highly questionable when 
humans claim to be the only moral agents, but base that claim only on their own 
anthropocentric definition of the term. This is not to assert that humans cannot define 
moral agency because there is no objective standard by which to judge their definition. 
Objective reasoning is the only measure we have, but we must be vigilant in our 
recognition of our inherent anthropocentricity when attempting to assess the moral 
standing of nonhuman beings. This may be another issue that can be clarified by the 
distinction between interspecies and intraspecies ethics. 
The principle of utility necessitates a weighing of the goods against the costs in 
terms of the likely consequences of any action in order to select the obligatory action. 
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When this is applied to conflicts of interests between human and nonhuman individuals, 
how does the human accurately and objectively value or consider the interests of the 
nonhuman individual? Singer, to demonstrate this difficulty, offers the example of hitting a 
horse or hitting a human and asserts that "the same blow would cause less pain to the 
animal with the tougher skin" (Bowie et al. 1992, 482). While his point is well taken, one 
might take it one step further. Horses can be high-strung individuals and it is quite possible 
that hitting a horse could cause, in addition to the pain, a fright-induced panic resulting in 
the horse blindly running over a cliff and dying from the fall. Regarding relative toughness 
of skin, rhinoceroses have very thick skin, however, it is extremely sensitive as any zoo 
keeper can attest. The point is that it is very problematic that humans will be able to 
properly evaluate the interests of nonhuman individuals. Most humans lack sufficient 
knowledge of nonhuman species to appraise their interests, and objectivity seems nearly 
impossible in most situations. 
7.) Singer passes dualistic judgment on all life forms by his reference to "down the 
evolutionary ladder'' (Singer 1990, 171). Marti Kheel asserts that Western thought tends 
to see the world in terms of Cartesian dualism--male and female, mind and body, us and 
them, subject and object, superior and inferior, animate and inanimate, reason and 
emotion, culture and nature, and so forth (Bowie et al. 1992, 515). Two characteristics 
are common to dualities: one half of the duality is "always valued more than the other," 
and ''the more valued half is always seen as 'male' and the less valued as 'female"' (Bowie 
et at. 1992, 516). This dualism, according to Kheel, has resulted in the exploitation of the 
less valued half such as females, animals, and nature by the more valued half-human and 
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male. Dualism has also contributed to the perception of the world in terms of a vertical 
hierarchy, or up and down. A common example of this spatial metaphor is the view of the 
"evolutionary scale of life with man, considered the most superior species, at the top and 
bacteria, the lowest life-form, at the bottom. The expression, "climbing the ladder of 
success" relates to another vertical hierarchy. K.heel rejects this "verbal spatial metaphor'' 
(Bowie et al. 1992, 516). K.heel asserts that in all such polarities or hierarchies the first 
half of the duality or top half of a hierarchy are always valued more than the other. In 
Singer's context, the sentient top half is more valued than the non-sentient lower half 
Kheel points out that animalliberationists and ethical humanists alike argue over 
the "relative values of the individual parts of nature" (Bowie et al. 1992, 517). Various 
characteristics are asserted to be the "right one'' for determining moral standing. These 
characteristics include sentience, consciousness, rationality, self-determination, interests 
and so on. A being that possesses the chosen characteristic is awarded some degree of 
moral standing, while those unfortunates that lack it have none. It is ironic, K.heel asserts, 
that "although many of these writers feel that they are arguing against notions of 
hierarchy, the vast majority simply remove one set of hierarchies only to establish another'' 
(Bowie et al. 1992, 517). In other words, they are merely replacing one form of speciesism 
with another. 
Riane Eisler agrees with Kheel's argument and asserts that there are two basic 
models of social systems. The dominator model of social relations is "primarily based on 
the organizational principle of ranking according to relative value. This social system can 
22 
take the form of a matriarchy or, much more commonly, a patriarchy. "The other model is 
a partnership model, which has a single form. The primary organizational principle ... is 
linking" (Lazlo 1991, 181). 
Singer chooses not to take the obvious next step in moral evolution of extending 
moral considerability to the entire class of living beings. As Regan points out, Singer's 
claim that the "capacity for suffering or enjoying things (sentience) is a prerequisite for 
having interests at all" implies that some property or properties are to be valued more than 
life itself After all, if one is seeking a trait or property that is common to all members of a 
class, why would one stop at the level of duality ( sentient/nonsentient) rather than take the 
single additional step to the unifYing trait that is common to all species---life. Is it not true 
that life is a prerequisite for sentiencelnonsentience? A functionalist might argue that 
sentience is a trait common to all organisms. 
One might suggest that in the interest of consistency moral standing ought to be 
extended to inanimate matter as well. The distinction between animate and inanimate 
matter is, however, enormous and nonarbitrary. Paul Taylor points out that a living being 
carries "out its life functions according to the laws of its species-specific nature" 
(Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 354). It is obvious that inanimate matter 'carries out' 
nothing. Even the most sophisticated machine is still inanimate matter organized by a life-
form to carry out some function of the life-form. According to Taylor, "All organisms, 
whether conscious or not, are teleological centers of life in the sense that each is a unified, 
coherently ordered system of goal-oriented activities that has a constant tendency to 
protect and maintain the organism's existence" (Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 355). 
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The moral evolution of our species has not been without struggle and controversy. 
Nevertheless, it has progressed from extending moral standing exclusively to alpha 
(dominant) humans, to white male humans, to all human males, to the human species, to 
some species. We recognized in each case, except species, that our values, reflected in our 
favored classifications, were arbitrary and superficial. Some like Goodpaster, Schweitzer, 
and Taylor argue that the qualifYing attribute necessary for moral standing should be life, 
not a secondary characteristic of it Moral standing ought to be extended to all living 
beings regardless of their position in the phylogenetic spectrum. Reproduction is the prime 
mover. of life, and the value of any action or trait is determined by its contribution to the 
fulfillment of the reproduction interest. The dominant power of the reproduction interest is 
well known in all species of life. Reproduction becomes the measure of all the traits or 
properties of life. Reproduction is dependent on surviving to sexual maturity. Any threat 
to survival triggers the "fight or flee" reflex which is innate in all forms of life including 
human. It is just as likely that the response will be reflexive without any mitigating 
reasoning occurring. It is even recognized in legal terms as a legitimate defense for any 
action--even the use of deadly force to prevent being killed. It can be argued that life and 
reproduction have intrinsic value. Therefore, all properties, characteristics, traits, and so 
on, are of instrumental value to life and reproduction. This will be discussed in detail in 
Part Two of this paper. 
Conclusion: 
The author submits that Singer's criteria for sentience are anthropomorphic, fail to 
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recognize the interests inherent in all life forms, and, in spite of his arguments to the 
contrary, are arbitrary. Although a functionalist version of sentience might realistically 
extend sentience to all life· forms, sentience still is a characteristic of a class and in my 
opinion moral significance should be defined by class membership not some favored trait 
of the class. In human society, moral standing is recognized for all members of the human 
class, not just those who meet some preferred or idealized species characteristic or trait 
such as rationality. Otherwise, human infants, and the mentally impaired would have no 
rights. In addition, utilitarian-based animal rights seem unworkable for the reasons 
discussed above. 
The next argument is, like Singer's, a welfare position. However, Rachels argues 
that equal consideration of interests should be based on individual similarities and 
differences rather than the possession of some favored trait like sentience. 
James Rachels: Moral individualism. 
Rachels argues for a moral individualism that rejects the idea of a "separate moral 
category" for humans. He bases his case on the Darwinian thesis that the "illumination of 
men's minds" (Regan and Singer 1989, 95) was the product of a gradual evolutionary 
process. This thesis " ... undermines some aspects of traditional morality" (Regan and 
Singer 1989, 95). One of these is the assertion that humans are morally special organisms 
by virtue of their species membership. This is typically justified by an appeal to theism 
and/or an anthropocentric, supernatural, creation myth that sets the human species outside 
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and above nature. "Is the fact that a being is human a reason for treating it with greater 
consideration than is given members of other species?" (Regan and Singer 1989, 95). 
Rachels states that there are three possible answers to this query; unqualified speciesism, 
qualified speciesism, and moral individualism. 
Unqualified speciesism is the assertion that membership in a particular species is 
sufficient for moral standing. Rachels offers little in support of this position, and what he 
does offer is borrowed from Robert Nozick, who speculates that there is a "general 
principle that the members of any species may legitimately give their fellows more weight 
than they give members of other species" (Regan and Singer 1989, 96). This principle is 
apparently derived by extending kin selection (Campbell 1993, 1184)) through clan, tribe, 
race, and so on to species selection. Actually, such a principle is supported intuitively. 
Most of us can think of many examples of individuals giving more weight to their own 
kind than to members of other species. In fact, it could be argued that speciescentrism is 
innate in all life forms, would increase species fitness and, therefore, would be "selected 
for'' in the evolutionary process. 
The difficulty with this position, as Rachels points out, is that the other forms of 
group-membership between kin and species like sex, race, and ethnicity, for example, "are 
not always (if they are ever) morally significant" (Regan and Singer 1989, 97). Rachels 
suggests that if it is acceptable to discriminate at one level in the progression from kin to 
species it could be argued that it is acceptable to discriminate at any level, race for 
example. "Race is, in this sense, akin to family" (Vandermeer, 1996, 103). Kin selection is 
based on the genetic similarity of family relatives and as such has a biological base in 
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inclusive fitness (Campbelll993, 1184). This suggests that it could be argued that where 
there is a genetic basis for giving an individual or group a higher weight in conflicts of 
interests with outsiders it could be morally justifiable. Even if this argument held, it could 
only support discrimination at the other group levels if it could be shown that there was a 
significant genetic basis for that discrimination. Races are clearly genetically linked, but the 
relevant question is to what degree. Most of us categorize people according to phenotypic 
or physical traits, but when we categorize according to race the implication is that the 
genetic differences extend beyond phenotype to genotype; in other words, there are not 
just superficial or trivial physical differences, but rather deep or profound differences. 
Scientific studies have consistently shown that race "is not a biological issue ... race is 
socially constructed" (Vandermeer 1996, 125). 
This paper is not the place for an in depth argument about the genetic basis of 
race. However, for those inclined to pursue the issue further, Vandermeer offers a 
powerful argument for this claim along with scientific evidence to support it in his recent 
book, Reconstructing Biology. There is even less reason to connect sex to kin selection. 
Unqualified speciesism is not supported rationally. 
Qualified speciesism still requires membership in a favored species, but that alone 
is not enough to warrant moral standing. Favored species membership must be correlated 
with an additional trait or quality like rationality, autonomous agency, or "interests" to 
merit moral standing. Traditional moralists, themselves members of the exclusive species, 
argue for anthropocentric membership criteria, then assert that no other species has the 
required characteristic. The usual required trait is "fully rational, autonomous agency" 
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(Regan and Singer 1989, 97). The importance of this distinguishing trait is revealed by 
two relevant considerations. 
Humans have for eons utilized virtually all other species for food, clothing, 
companionship, entertainment, education and so on. If humans were exploited in the same 
manner, however, it would be considered profoundly immoral. A basic premise of moral 
thought requires a rational justification for treating individuals differently. The justification 
of human exploitation of nonhuman organisms is based on moral standing-- who has it and 
who doesn't. According to the traditional moralists, humans are the only species known to 
humans that have it: fully rational, autonomous agency. On this view, nonhumans cannot 
have moral standing, their interests are relevant only in an anthropocentric context. We are 
free to continue to utilize nonhuman organisms in any way that benefits us. 
Rachels offers two insightful challenges to this assertion. We treat nonhumans in 
many different ways. Are all these different actions justified by the one favored trait? For 
example, how does the lack of fully rational, autonomous agency, language, or wants 
justifY inflicting the Draize test in which the irritancy of cosmetics and other substances are 
tested by placing the substance into the eyes of rabbits? What does one have to do with 
the other? Rachels sums it up with a general principle: "Whether a difference between 
individuals justifies a difference in treatment depends on the kind of treatment in question. 
A difference in characteristics or traits that justifies one kind of difference in treatment 
need not justify another'' (Regan and Singer 1989, 99). Human reason cannot justifY the 
entire spectrum of differences in treatment between humans and nonhumans. At best it can 
justifY some types of disparity in treatment. 
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Rachels also raises the question of humans who lack the favored trait such as the 
mentally handicapped. Nonrational humans would lack moral standing, therefore, they 
could be exploited and abused in the same manner as all nonhumans. Traditional moralists 
claim that handicaps are not relevant to moral standing since they are viewed as 
modifications of the preferred trait. A nonrational human has the moral standing of a 
rational individual because it is still a member of a species or group in which the preferred 
trait is characteristic. Rachels offers a convincing counterexample against this contention. 
He raises the hypothetical situation of a chimpanzee that could read and speak in English. 
Suppose it clearly is a rational being. Would it not then be entitled to moral consideration? 
According to traditional moralists, it would not, since the moral standing of chimpanzees 
is based on the typical species characteristics, and chimpanzees are characteristically 
nonrational. This is just a more sophisticated version of speciesism and, according to 
Rachels, qualified speciesism fails. 
The third answer Rachels refers to is moral individualism. Rachels maintains that 
the issue of moral standing must be based on individual organisms rather than any group 
of organisms. Every individual organism is entitled to equal consideration of interests. This 
does not mean equality in treatment regardless of the kinds of individuals involved. 
According to Rachels' concept of moral individualism, " ... what matters is the individual 
characteristics of organisms and not the classes to which they are assigned" (Regan and 
Singer 1989, 103). This principle will"allow the human to assert a right to better 
treatment whenever there is some difference between him" and another individual (human 
or nonhuman) that justifies it. The human cannot claim greater rights or consideration 
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simply by virtue of his species affiliation or by the possession of some characteristic that is 
irrelevant to the issue at hand. 
Objections: 
No direct objections to Rachels' moral individualism were found in the literature. 
This is not to say that there are none, but only that, for whatever reason, no one has thus 
far felt the need to publish any. There are, however, several objections that have particular 
significance relative to Rachels' moral individualism. Some of these objections have been 
mentioned above with regard to Singer's equal consideration of interests. They are as 
follows: 
I.) One concern is that only one species is deciding what characteristics are necessary 
for moral standing for the entire phylogenetic spectrum of species. This raises many 
questions about the criteria for moral agency, the objectivity of evaluations of moral 
standing of other species, whether moral agency entails that moral agents may define the 
moral status of other beings, and so on. Some might argue that humans, as the only 
species capable of moral agency, are justified in defining the limits of moral obligations, if 
any, to other species. I submit that we cannot yet claim to be the only moral agent on this 
planet. Several other social species have relatively complex codes of behavior that may 
include at least a rudimentary from of species-specific moral agency. 
2.) It is impossible for humans to completely remove their anthropocentric glasses to 
objectively evaluate what characteristics should count for moral standing. Obviously it 
highly questionable when humans claim to be the only moral agents, but base that claim 
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only on their own anthropocentric definition of the term. This is not to assert that humans 
cannot define moral agency because there is no objective standard by which to judge their 
definition. Objective reasoning is the only measure we have, but we must be vigilant in our 
recognition of our inherent anthropocentricity when attempting to assess the moral 
standing of nonhuman beings. 
Discussion: 
I.) Rachels' argument is similar to Singer's in the sense that he rejects species 
membership as a criterion for moral considerability. It could be argued that Singer's 
position is a narrow form of moral individualism since his criterion for moral 
considerability is whether an individual is capable of suffering. Rachels, however, is not as 
restrictive and asserts that similarities and differences are the relevant criteria for moral 
considerability between individuals. This seems too vague, however, to be of practical use, 
and Rachels fails to offer a more specific criteria for moral considerability. 
2.) Rachels' counterexample about the chimpanzee that could read and speak in 
English is interesting. Given the fact that humans and members of the genus Pan share 
"approximately 990/o genetic identity," (AZA 1994) it is at least theoretically possible that 
man and chimpanzee could hybridize. Many zoos have chimpanzee sperm in cryogenic 
storage where it could be "acquired" and used to fertilize a human ovum either in vitro or 
utero. As a former zoo keeper, I can affirm that this is well within the capability of zoo 
persomel. Rachels' hypothetical situation could become a reality. Imagine the 
ramifications. 
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In the case of Rachels' conversant chimpanzee, the animal was still a member of a 
species that characteristically is nonrational and, therefore, the traditional moralists would 
argue, just as nonrational humans have moral standing by virtue of their membership in a 
rational species, the "talking chimp" would have no moral standing by virtue of its 
membership in a nonrational species. This argument would not hold for a hybrid 
human/chimpanzee with both rational and nonrational species parentage. How would dual 
species membership be considered in detennining moral standing? Perhaps a modified 
speciesism would work in which any individual with the preferred trait or membership in a 
species in which the trait is characteristic would have moral standing. In the case of a 
rational hybrid, the issue would be easier to decide, since the hybrid would also be a 
member of a rational species. But would it? What about a nonrational hybrid? Would 
membership in a rational species be sufficient in this case for moral standing? How would 
species membership be defined for a hybrid? If the hybrid was fertile and produced 
offspring with a chimpanzee, the offspring would be only one-fourth human. Would there 
be some minimum percent that is necessary for species membership? 
This certainly sounds strange, but a similar dilemma has plagued Native Americans 
who are in the unique position of being members of two distinct socio-political groups-
American and tribal. As a result of the European conquest, there are many individuals of 
mixed heritage. All citizens of our country are members of the American group, but mixed 
blood people can also be members of a tribe from which certain benefits may accrue both 
to the tribe in terms of federal allotments and to the individual in psychological and 
financial terms. The difficulty arises from the issue of defining what it is to be a Native 
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American. How much Indian blood is necessary to qualify for membership? Some tribes 
have argued in court that one sixty-fourth Indian blood is sufficient to be an American 
Indian. No matter how you construct it, moral standing based on species membership 
and/or the possession of some favored trait is still speciesism. 
3.) Rachels' argument is also interesting because it is clearly Darwinian. According to 
evolutionary theory if we trace back along the genetic history of any or all species, the 
progenitors become more closely related. All living organisms have similarities and 
differences depending on, among other factors, the degree of convergence and divergence 
of their lineage lines. The phylogenetic spectrum of life-forms can be compared to the 
visible electromagnetic (em) spectrum. The visible spectrum is a continuous band of 
discrete frequencies or wavelengths of em radiation. All the discrete wavelengths from 380 
nanometers (nm) to 760 nm possess similar properties except for the difference in their 
respective wavelengths which is a function of their rates of vibration or frequencies. A 
subjective description of the spectrum refers to the band of discrete but continuous colors 
as the rainbow. We arbitrarily assign names to our sensory image of em radiation. For 
example, we refer to em radiation of700 nm wavelength as red. It is not unheard of, 
although it is uncommon, to refer to red, blue, or yellow as species of color. We can view 
the phylogenetic spectrum, audio spectrum, the spectrum of elements or atoms that we 
commonly refer to as the periodic table, or the molecular spectrum and so on as analogous 
to the visible spectrum or rainbow. It is just as appropriate to refer to Strontium as a 
species of atom, or to DNA as a species of molecule, as it is to refer to a chimpanzee as a 
species oflife. 
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Just as the visible spectrum is a continuous band of discrete wavelengths, the 
phylogenetic spectrum of life is a continuous band of discrete species. There are certain 
fundamental characteristics that are common to all members of a spectrum. It is these 
fundamental characteristics that define the unity of the spectrum. Moral standing based on 
species membership within the phylogenetic spectrum is no less arbitrary than moral 
standing based on sex, race, or some other characteristic within a species. Moral standing 
based on equal consideration of individual characteristics and interests seems nonarbitrary. 
4.) The question of humans determining moral standing across the entire phylogenetic 
spectrum has particular significance for Rachels' position because it places major emphasis 
on the differences and similarities between humans and other life-forms. This seems like 
giving the fox the authority to determine the moral standing, if any, of the chickens. Of 
course, it could be objected that we are rational beings capable of objective and logical 
decisions about the moral standing of animals. However, we must remember that in 
evolutionary terms we were and are foremost an animal, albeit a rational one. There are 
limits inherent in our objectivity. We cannot be rational in a nonhuman way. We cannot be 
nonanthropocentric. 
Conclusion: 
Moral individualism would be difficult to apply because the only guidelines for 
moral determinations are individual differences and similarities relative to humans. It could 
be argued that many actions of questionable morality could be morally justified based on 
differences and similarities. Is that not how racists justifY racism? Would not the clever fox 
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assert that chickens cannot have moral standing because they lack cleverness? Without 
more clearly and restrictively defined criteria for moral standing, moral individualism 
seems unworkable. 
The next argument takes us from animal welfare to animal rights and asserts that 
those humans and nonhumans who meet certain criteria for moral standing all have equal 
rights. This is a more controversial position because some animals would be considered 
morally equal with humans. 
Tom Regan: Animal Rights. 
Tom Regan is a philosopher who argues that being a "subject-of-a-life" has 
inherent value and, therefore, by the respect principle, equal rights. 
Premise 1. We are to treat those individuals who have inherent value in ways that 
respect their inherent value. (Respect principle) 
Premise 2. To be the subject-of-a-life is to have inherent value. 
Conclusion: Subjects-of-a-life are to be treated in ways that respect their inherent 
value. 
Premise 1. All normal mammalian animals aged one year or older are subjects-of-a-
life. 
Premise 2. Subjects-of-a-life are to be treated in ways that respect their inherent 
value. 
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Conclusion: Normal mammalian animals aged one year or older are to be treated in 
ways that respect their inherent value. 
Tom Regan asserts that there is a fundamental flaw in the relationship between 
humans and non~humans " ... that allows us to view animals as our resources ... " to be 
exploited in any way we desire (Harnack 1996, 35). Regan perceives the issue of human 
treatment of nonhuman animals as a matter of rights. He asserts that those beings that are 
''the experiencing subject of a life, a conscious creature having an individual welfare" have 
inherent value of their own (Harnach 1996, 37). Subjects~of~a~life have beliefs, desires, 
perception, memory, a sense of the future, an emotional life, sentience, preference and 
welfare interests, volition, a psychophysical identity over time and so on. (Armstrong and 
Botzler 1993, 321). Regan's definition of'subject-of-a-life' is very restrictive, basically 
limiting it to all "nonnal mammalian animals, aged one year or more" (Armstrong and 
Botzler 1993, 325). It is this criterion that detennines what living beings possess inherent 
value, which he conceives " ... to be a categorical value, admitting of no degrees" 
(Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 321). From the respect principle it follows that "We are to 
treat those individuals who have inherent value in ways that respect their inherent value 
(Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 322). Furthermore, " ... to fail to show respect for the 
other's independent value is to act immorally, to violate the individual's rights" (Regan 
and Singer 1989, 111). 
There are those who might agree that some animals have inherent value, but hold 
that they have less that humans. Regan's response is to ask on what basis is their inherent 
value less? Because they lack reason, or autonomy, or morality? Then we must pass the 
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same judgment on infant and mentally impaired humans, something we are obviously not 
prepared to do. Regan supports his position by appealing to the argument from marginal 
cases. In this argument it is claimed that although infant and mentally deficient humans fail 
to meet all the criteria for a subject-of-a-life, they are still considered the bearers of rights 
that generate obligations in moral agents. These rights are derived from their being of a 
kind that normally has inherent value. Furthermore, Regan would respond that such a view 
would open the door to forms of discrimination that we consider immoral. Accordingly, 
Regan advocates the total abolition of the use of animals in science. 
Objections: 
1.) R. G. Frey argues that Regan's attempt to support his claims by invoking the 
argument from marginal cases fails because it assumes that all human life, however 
deficient, is of equal value (Regan and Singer 1989, 115). He rejects this assumption and 
maintains that there are good reasons for doing so. How do we value human life? 
According to Regan, categorically by membership in a species that meets the criterion for 
inherent value, that is to be a 'subject-of-a-life', rather than the quality of life. For Frey, on 
the other hand, the value of life is a function of its quality, which is a function of its 
richness, scope, or potential for enrichment. The quality of life for an anacephalic or brain 
dead human cannot be comparable to the quality of life of a normal human. In fact, one 
could argue that such defective human organisms are not human in the usual sense, 
therefore, it is unreasonable that they be valued equally with normal individuals. Our 
society recognizes this fact, as is evidenced by the standing accorded to such defective 
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individuals, particularly in the medical and legal fields. Severely defective humans are 
deemed of the lowest priority or ineligible for organ transplants, and they are legally 
considered moral subjects rather than moral agents. If humans are not all of equal value, 
Regan's argument fails. 
Even more fundamental than the claim of equal inherent value is Regan's claim 
that animals have inherent value at all. Regan supports this claim by appealing to the fact 
that humans still value severely defective individuals who clearly have no instrumental 
value whatever, therefore, they must have inherent value. Since rationality is not a 
criterion for the inherent value of humans, how could it be a criteria for the inherent value 
of animals? Frey argues that, in the case of severe senile dementia or anacephalism, there 
cannot be any inherent value in the usual sense of the term since, "The quality of life can 
plummet, to a point where we would not wish that life on even our worst enemies; and I 
see no reason to pretend that a life I would not wish upon even my worst enemy is 
nevertheless as valuable as the life of any normal, adult human" (Regan and Singer 1989, 
116). 
2.) Mary Anne Warren argues that Regan fails to adequately support his argument for 
inherent value. She asserts that he defines inherent value almost exclusively in negative 
terms by stating what it is not, rather than what it is (Harnack 1996, 42). It is not 
dependent on the value that either the individual or anyone else places on it. Neither is it 
sentience or any other mental capacity. We know what he thinks it is not, but the real 
question is what is it. The closest Regan comes to a definition of inherent value is to say 
what it is to have it: "To say that we have such value is to say that we are something more 
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than, something different from, mere receptacles" (Harnack 1996, 36). Furthermore, "Tf 
the inherent value of a being is completely independent of the value that it or anyone else 
places upon its experiences, then why does the fact that it has certain sorts of experiences 
constitute evidence that it has inherent value?" (Harnack 1996, 43). As a result, Regan's 
concept of inherent value is obscure and ambiguous and Warren's objection has merit. 
Warren states that Regan fails to define a clear connection between inherent value 
and having moral rights. She asserts that it "does not seem incoherent to say that some 
things are inherently valuable ... and yet are not the sorts of things which can have moral 
rights" (Harnack 1996, 43). She mentions mountains, rivers and trees as examples of 
things that are not typically thought of as having moral rights Additionally, it seems 
plausible to ascribe inherent value to things which are not individuals like species, but it 
may be incoherent to ascribe moral rights to them. She concludes that the idea of"inherent 
value seems to create at least as many problems as it solves (Harnack 1996, 43). 
Warren asks other pertinent questions as well. What exactly does "subject-of-a-
life" mean? Tf it is defined such that only those species that have subjective awareness are 
subjects-of-a-life, how do we distinguish that definitively in nonhuman organisms? Like 
Kheel with Singer's position, she raises the objection that "Regan's theory forces us to 
divide all living things into two categories", those that meet the criterion and those that do 
not (Harnack 1996, 43). Since the criteria for being a subject-of-a-life are subjective, 
determinations will be arbitrary, particularly for individuals that are near where the line 
falls and, as a result, are not clearly in one group or the other. She also raise the question 
of anthropocentrism in evaluating the traits of nonhuman organisms. 
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Accordingly, Warren concludes that Regan's argument is inconclusive, and she 
argues for what she refers to as the weak animal rights case. Warren's position is as 
follows: While it is true that the conventional view of moral agency restricts its 
applicability to rational self-legislative autonomous agents and "logical analysis will not 
answer the question of whether animals have moral rights, practical considerations may, 
nevertheless, incline us to say that they do" (Harnack 1996, 48). She proposes sentience 
as the only practical criterion for determining which animals have moral rights. 
Discussion: 
I.) Frey raises important questions about how we value human life. In his objection to 
the categorical nature of inherent value, he correctly notes that what we say about how we 
value human life does not always agree with practice. But the observation that we often 
fail to treat humans as of equal value in no way refutes Regan's assertion that all 
"subjects-of-a-life" are to be treated equally based on the categorical nature of inherent 
value. Frey, in order to refute Regan's position, needs to show that inherent value is not 
categorical. To assert that the fact that it is not categorical in practice shows that inherent 
value can not be categorical is to beg the question. Frey's objection fails. 
He also argues against inherent value as a criterion for moral standing. Here he 
argues that there are good reasons not to hold all human life regardless of quality as of 
equal value. Hardin's lifeboat ethics demonstrates the true disparity in value between 
humans based on quality oflife considerations (Bowie et al. 1992). Who would a 
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reasonable person save if he could save only one, a human suffering from severe senile 
dementia or a normal healthy dog? 
2.) Warren's first objection that Regan defines inherent value only in negative terms 
seems to be supported by a review ofRegan's writings on the subject. However, the 
question she raises about how certain types of individual experiences provide evidence 
that the individual has inherent value seems to be based on the erroneous assumption that, 
according to Regan, inherent value is completely independent of the value that the 
individual organism or anyone else places on its experiences. Regan states that, "we are 
each of us the experiencing subject-of~a~life, a conscious creature having an individual 
welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others" (Harnack 19%, 
37). 
In Warren's second objection she alleges that Regan fails to define a connection 
between inherent value and moral rights. Moral rights are usually considered the exclusive 
province of moral agents because moral agency, as noted above, is traditionally conceived 
as necessitating certain capacities to be a moral agent; the ability to recognize moral issues 
as well as to be morally responsible, for example. This gives rise to questions like how 
could nonrational organisms be morally responsible and, thereby, moral agents without 
even the capacity to have a concept. If inherent value is enough to warrant moral agency, 
then it must be a nontypical moral agency and, as such, would require a definition, which 
Regan fails to supply. Regan offers no solution for this difficulty, but we recognize 
abstract entities like corporations as having moral rights so why not ecosystems or species. 
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It is difficult to reconcile inherent value of nonrational organisms with the concept of 
moral agent. The evidence supports Warren's objection. 
The other questions Warren raises are important, and Regan needs to respond to 
them in order to counter their impact. Warren's counterproposal for weak animal rights is 
no better than Regan's. It amounts to Singer's argument, except she argues for moral 
rights for all sentient beings rather than equal consideration of interests. Therefore, based 
on the arguments against Singer's position that were discussed above, we can conclude 
that Warren's weak animal rights proposal is inadequate. 
3.) In my opinion, Regan's argument is less cogent than Singer's. Even if we grant his 
argument for inherent value (which I am inclined to do, but not on the restrictive subject-
of-a-life criterion), he fails to make a case that inherent value is, in itself, sufficient for 
moral agency and, thereby, moral rights. The concept of rights by traditional definition is 
relevant only to rational, self-legislative, moral agents in a socio-cultural context. If Regan 
is using rights in a different context, it is incumbent on him to state his context. What he 
offers by way of justification is his subject-of-a-life criterion which essentially seems to fall 
between sentience and rationality in spite of his assertion that inherent value is independent 
of sentience, rationality, sex, race or any other trait that would open the door to 
discrimination. He states that individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs, desires, 
perceptions, memory, a sense of their own future, sentience, preference and welfare 
interests, volition, and a psychophysical identity over time. To be a conscious subject of a 
life entails sentience, although sentience is not sufficient, and mental states such that, 
although rationality is not entailed, it comes close (Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 321). He 
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declares that the subject-of-a-life criterion "identifies a similarity that holds between moral 
agents and patients" (Annstrong and Dotzler 1993, 321). Furthermore, "since inherent 
value is a categorical value, admitting of no degrees, any supposed relevant similarity must 
itselfbe categorical" (Annstrong and Dotzler 1993, 321). Even granting that inherent 
value is categorical and that a criterion that identifies a similarity between moral agents 
and patients might be categorical, this is not sufficient to entail moral rights for all 
subjects-of-a-life. If moral agents and patients are to be melded into one moral class, what 
is that class? Are they all moral agents, which seems impossible by definition, or moral 
patients, which Regan clearly feels is too inadequate to do the job he wants done. His 
position precludes any other option like moral agents or patients depending on which 
criteria are met. 
4.) Another major problem with Regan's position is that the subject-of-a-life criterion 
involves a complex set of parameters that in many cases are difficult to evaluate. It is 
clearly inappropriate for the vast majority of nonhuman species. The categorical nature of 
the subject-of-a-life criterion requires that a line of demarcation be drawn between animals 
that can meet it and those that do not. In evaluating animals according to the subject-of-a-
life criterion, there is no obvious line of distinction between those that qualify and those 
that do not. Therefore, wherever the line is drawn seems arbitrary. This is supported by 
Regan's assertion that only mammals of one year or older can have inherent value. This 
qualification apparently excludes mice or any other mammals that are reproductively 
mature at much less than one year of age. 
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5.) Another difficulty arises from Regan's appeal to the argument from marginal cases 
to support his assertion that rationality cannot be a requirement for moral agency. The 
argument from marginal cases is the assertion that, since we recognize the rights of 
nonrational humans, it cannot be the case that rationality is required for moral agency. 
This argument is countered by the fact that, although we recognize the rights of 
nonrational humans, those rights are exercised as rights of a moral patient rather than a 
moral agent. In other words, nonrational humans are capable of being owed obligations. 
6.) Ahhough Regan asserts that moral standing can only apply to individuals as 
opposed to groups, an analogy between racism and speciesism could provide the basis to 
argue for reverse discrimination as a means of retributive or compensatory justice. Just as 
in our culture it was deemed just to institute a policy of discrimination for those aroups 
that had been for so long the victims of discrimination against their interests, it could be 
argued that the victims of speciesism should be compensated in a similar way. Utilitarians 
like Thomas Nagel defend such a response to racism (Bowie et al. 1992, 362). 
Furthermore, it could be argued that consistency justifies the same response in the case of 
spectestsm. 
The obvious objection to this point is that victims of racism have inherent value 
while animals do not, therefore, the question of compensatory justice is not relevant since, 
in the case of speciesism, there is no inherent value to be lost or devalued. However, 
according to Regan's argument for the subject-of-a-life criterion, most species of 
mammals do have inherent value and ought to be, from the standpoint of consistency, 
treated equally. This might hold promise in dealing with the issue of endangered species. 
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Just as racial discrimination has resulted in great suffering for members of minorities so 
has speciesism resulted in great suffering for members of persecuted species. Would this 
mean that the Endangered Species Act is, in fact, an affirmative action program? Is the 
federal program for the recovery of bison an affirmative action plan? 
Conclusion: 
In the author's opinion, Regan • s argument is inadequate to extend moral agency to 
nonhuman species. Therefore, his claim that some nonhuman animals have rights fails. 
The last argument to be considered represents the opposite extreme of animal 
rights arguments, that animals cannot be moral agents and have moral rights. 
Cohen: Animals have no rights. 
Carl Cohen is a philosopher at the University of Michigan who argues that only 
humans can meet the traditional criteria for moral agency and moral rights. 
Premise I. Moral obligations can only obtain within a community of moral agents. 
Premise 2. Only human beings are moral agents. 
Conclusion: Only human beings have rights. 
Carl Cohen argues that rights are, in general, "claims, or potential claims, within a 
community of moral agents" (Cohen 1986, 865). He defines moral capability as dependent 
on the capacities of free will, rationality, self-consciousness, membership in a moral 
community, and intuitive cognition of right or wrong action. He asserts that only humans 
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have all these capacities and, therefore, only humans can have rights or obligations. He 
acknowledges, however, that humans can and do have obligations to animals. They may 
arise from special relationships like those that exist between humans and their pets or 
domestic livestock or they may arise from humane considerations of minimizing or ending 
an animal's suffering by euthanasia. Cohen argues that rights and obligations are not 
reciprocals of one another and that obligations to animals do not entail that animals have 
rights (Cohen 1986, 866). He cites the principles ofnonmaleficence and beneficence that 
obligate humane treatment of animals, but asserts that "To treat animals humanely , 
however, is not to treat them as humans or as the holder of rights" (Cohen 1986, 866). 
Objections: 
Cohen addresses several objections to his position incJuding the argument from 
marginal cases and the argument that the criteria for moral capacity, like the abilities to 
communicate, reason, or exhibit desires and preferences, are also possessed by many 
animals. 
1.) The argument from marginal cases asserts that if having rights requires rationality, 
then those humans that are clearly nonrational for whatever reason, be it infancy, senility, 
mental retardation, and so on, must be without rights. Since this is not the case and 
nonrational humans are recognized as having rights, it can not be the case that rationality 
is required for moral agency. Cohen rejects this argument, claiming that "the capacity for 
moral judgment that distinguishes humans from animals is not a test to be administered to 
human beings one by one" (Cohen 1986, 866). He maintains that the objection from 
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marginal cases fails: "it mistakenly treats an essential feature of humanity as though it were 
a screen for sorting humans" (Cohen 1986, 866). The fact that some humans lack the 
ability to perform as moral agents is not sufficient reason to deny them moral standing. 
According to Cohen it is an issue of kind. Defective humans are still members of a kind 
that is normally moral. Animals never have been. 
2.) The second objection that many animals possess the criteria for moral capacity 
fairs no better according to Cohen. While it is true that animals " ... do indeed exhibit 
remarkable behavior ... ," it is impossible for them to be members in a moral community 
governed by moral rules or even to have a concept of morality let alone make moral 
decisions (Cohen 1986, 867). 
1.) Rachels objects to a point that Cohen asserts in his objection to the argument from 
marginal cases which as we have seen is based on our recognition of the moral standing of 
defective humans. Cohen tries to refute this argument by asserting that it is an issue of 
kind, and "Animals are of such a kind that it is impossible for them to give or withhold 
voluntary consent or to make a moral choice (Cohen 1986, 866). According to Rachels, it 
is obvious that animals are withholding consent by their "frantic efforts to escape" 
(Armstrong and Dotzler 1993, 339). 
Rachels also offers the example of the rational chimpanzee discussed above in 
which it is denied moral standing even though it clearly possesses the relevant criteria 
because it is a member of a kind that normally is nonrational. Accordingly, he finds 
Cohen's argument irrational. 
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Discussion: 
Cohen takes a very strong position and makes some valid points, however, his 
argument is weak. His first premise seems reasonable. The second premise, however, is 
not so clear. Richard Alexander, E. 0. Wilson, and others argue that morality is an 
evolved adaptation. If they are correct, it is reasonable to expect that other species have 
evolved at least rudimentary or premoral behavioral systems. Moral systems are societies 
with rules (Alexander 1987, 1). They are social contracts defining what is permitted and 
what is prohibited--codes ofbehavior. Many nonhuman societies such as wolf packs, lion 
prides, meerkat bands, and insect colonies are regulated by codes of behavior, both 
genetically coded and culturally codified. Although the members of these social units do 
not have a moral concept in the strict sense of the term, their codes of behavior can be 
considered as a crude form of contractarianism. The members of the social unit behave in 
ways that are consistent with the code of behavior and the rewards and punishments that 
derive from cooperation or conflict. They can abide by the rules or be punished and even 
banished. This type of behavioral code is typical of hominid hunter-gatherer societies and 
can be considered a premoral system. More will be said on this subject in Part Two of this 
paper. In any case, premise 2 is in doubt. 
Although Cohen indirectly touches on the concept of moral patient when he 
acknowledges that "few will deny that we are at least obliged to act humanely toward 
animals, he argues his position exclusively from the case of moral agents. He asserts that 
humans who are unable to perform moral functions still possess rights in virtue of their 
being of a kind that is normally a moral agent. Given that they are of such a kind, this does 
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not mitigate the fact that they are incapable of being moral agents and, therefore, are not 
moral agents. That they generate obligations for moral agents is true only because moral 
agents recognize them as moral subjects. It would seem that arguing for moral standing as 
moral patients would provide a stronger argument in support of moral standing for those 
humans who fail to meet the criteria of moral agency than the argument for being of a 
kind. A moral subject is a being to whom moral agents have obligations, that are not 
themselves able to have obligations. From this it follows that at least some animals must 
be moral subjects. Pets, domestic animals, wild animals that are captive in zoos or other 
similar situations, and any other nonhuman animal that is in any way managed by moral 
agents must be moral subjects. Just as moral agency is not defined by species membership 
but rather by individual capabilities as acknowledged by Cohen and stated above in his 
second premise, the definition of a moral subject must be based on whether a being can be 
owed obligations, not on species membership. Furthermore, while being a moral agent 
seems to entail being a moral subject, it does not follow that a being that is not a moral 
agent is also not a moral subject. Nonhuman and human animals that are not moral agents 
are moral subjects if they are in a relationship with moral agents in such a way that they 
generate obligations for the moral agents. Cohen's argument holds insofar as it deals with 
moral agents. Those beings that cannot meet the criteria for moral agency cannot be moral 
agents or have moral rights. However, this does not preclude them from having moral 
standing as moral patients, a subject he fails to develop. 
Conclusion: Cohen's argument focuses on moral agency and, while he recognizes that 
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some animals have moral standing by virtue of their special relationship to a moral agent, 
he argues unconvincingly that only humans can have moral standing. 
Summary: 
The above arguments represent the primary positions in the animal rights debate. 
Although there are literally hundreds of publications on the subject, they basically deal 
with the implications of these fundamental arguments or variations of them. Although all 
of the arguments raise important issues, they are all seriously flawed or deficient in some 
way. 
The argument for equal consideration of interests is an attempt to justifY the 
extension of moral standing to those species of life that are sentient as moral patients not 
moral agents--animal welfare, not animal rights. The success of the argument depends on 
the criterion for moral standing. There are inherent difficulties in the application of 
sentience that make it unworkable and of questionable relevance to the issue of moral 
standing. Regan tries to invoke the principle of respect based on the inherent value of a 
subject-of-a-life, but this argument is even more restrictive than Singer's. Cohen's 
argument is an attempt to justifY speciesism, and it too fails for the reasons above. 
Rachel's argument for moral individualism is the most successful at eliminating speciesism, 
however, it is difficult to see how it would work, and Rachels fails to offer a strategy. 
Perhaps the best means of eliminating the potential for speciesism in determining 
moral standing is to argue that all life-forms have moral standing. Since it is clear that only 
rational, self legislative members of a moral community are moral agents, such an 
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argument must count al1 amoral agents as at least potential moral subjects depending on 
their situation relative to moral agents. This would encompass al1 beings that are, to one 
extent or another, dependent on or managed by moral agents. Since the governments of 
human nations in the name of their citizens hold in trust natural resources including 
wildlife, it can be argued that al1 wildlife are moral subjects. The only life-forms that would 
not have any moral standing would be those that are not capable of moral agency and are 
not in any way to be considered to be held in trust by or to be the common property of 
moral agents, either directly or indirectly, such as pelagic marine organisms that never 
enter the territorial waters of a moral agent or a community of moral agents. 
If species membership is not relevant to being a moral subject and we consider 
human moral subjects to possess rights, then all moral subjects should be owed obligations 
equally. Such an assertion is tantamount to heresy and would cause consternation 
throughout nearly the entire human species. I say nearly, because, there is a very tiny 
minority of humans who incorporate a similar view in their worldview. Many indigenous 
cultures view all forms of life as entitled to equal consideration of interests. The Native 
American view that all life-forms are equal participants in the web oflife is well known. It 
is not just a question of whether aU life-forms are entitled to equal consideration of 
interests, but in what context do these interests hold and are there different interests in 
different contexts, e.g. interspecies and intraspecies contexts. 
The objections and conclusions presented here may be of value to a natural 
resource manager in a dialogue with animal rights activists who base their advocacy on 
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philosophical or moral principles, however, they will be of little value with those whose 
advocacy is irrationaL being based primarily on emotion. 
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PART TWO 
Animal Rights: A Biocentric Perspective. 
L Introduction: 
Part Two of this thesis will consist of a presentation of two prominent arguments 
for a biocentric approach to animal rights, each followed by an objections section, a 
discussion section, and a conclusion section. Part Two will conclude with a discussion of 
important points in constructing a biocentric moral system. One of the principal objections 
to the arguments discussed above is that they are based on criteria for moral standing that 
result in some forms oflife being morally considerable and some not. Where the line that 
distinguishes moral standing falls inside the phylogenetic spectrum of life seems arbitrary, 
as has been noted above. This objection can be resolved by finding criteria for moral 
standing that distinguishes between life-forms based on clearly relevant differences or 
criteria that encompasses all life-forms (biocentric ). The latter would be preferable since 
the issue of arbitrary judgments of moral standing would not even reasonably arise. 
Kenneth Goodpaster and Paul Taylor have developed arguments for a biocentric 
criterion for moral standing. They both argue that moral considerability ought to 
encompass the entire phylogenetic spectrum. 
Kenneth Goodpaster: A biocentric criterion for moral considerability. 
Goodpaster argues that "nothing short of the condition ofbeing alive seems to be a 
plausible and nonarbitrary criterion" for moral considerability (Armstrong and Botzler 
1993, 348). Goodpaster defers the question of moral rights and argues only for the 
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broader and less demanding moral considerability. He also distinguishes between moral 
considerability and moral significance. Moral considerability involves the fundamental 
issue of who or what is morally considerable, and moral significance involves the issue of 
comparative moral weight in resolving cases of conflict. 
He begins his argument by invoking G. J. Warnock's approach to the issue of 
moral considerability from the perspective of a moral patient (subject) rather than a moral 
agent. The query becomes: what are the criteria for generating an obligation in moral 
agents? In other words, "what are the requirements for having moral standing in the moral 
sphere?" (Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 347). For Kantians like Cohen, the criteria for 
moral considerability are synonymous with those for moral agency (see Part I). Having 
interests is the criterion adopted by Singer, Frankena, and others (see Part I). 
Goodpaster rejects both of these criteria. He maintains that the interests criterion is 
used too restrictively in the sense that only beings that can have desires, wants, or aims 
can be represented or be beneficiaries and, therefore, have interests. Such an interpretation 
excludes many life-forms like plants, many animals, and some humans from moral 
considerability. Goodpaster points out that "in the face of their obvious tendencies to 
maintain and heal themselves, it is very difficult to reject the idea of interests on the part of 
trees [and plants generally] in remaining alive" (Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 351). 
He also rejects the assertion by Feinberg, Singer, and Frey that needs of living 
things like plants, for example the need of a tree to be watered, are not their needs but 
those of the moral agent: "Plants may need things in order to discharge their functions, but 
their functions are assigned by human interests, not their own" (Armstrong and Botzler 
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1993, 351). The only justification for their existence is solely for human interests. 
Goodpaster points out that the relevant interests of living beings are their own in 
continuing to live. He concludes " ... that the interest principle either grows to tit what we 
might call a 'life principle' or requires an arbitrary stipulation ... " of secondary 
characteristics. 
Objections: 
Goodpaster addresses six objections to his argument. 
1.) Some object that the principle of moral consideration for all living organisms is 
romanticism. Goodpaster responds that such a criticism misses the point of his argument, 
which is that sentience is not necessary for moral considerability. 
2.) Another might object that Goodpaster's argument suggests that moral 
considerability is co-extensive with life, and this in tum suggests that conscious beings 
have no more moral considerability than a vegetable. Goodpaster counters that this 
objection also misses the point of his position. Differences between life-forms are 
determined by moral significance, which is consistent with acknowledging the moral 
considerability of all life. 
3.) There are some who object that life itself cannot be adequately defined and, 
therefore, should not be a criterion for moral considerability. But Goodpaster argues that 
there are several adequate definitions, and other criteria like rationality, sentience, or the 
capacity to have interests are no better. He offers a definition by K. M. Sayre that he 
asserts is adequate: life is a " ... persistent state of low entropy, sustained by metabolic 
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processes for the accumulating of energy, and maintained in equilibrium with its 
environment by homeostatic feedback processes" (Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 352). 
4.) If life is the criterion for moral considerability, then it is possible to argue that ever 
larger biotic communities could satisfy the criterion for moral considerability. This would 
be a reductio of the life principle. Goodpaster counters that the implications should be 
taken seriously and cites the Gaia hypothesis that the biosphere, as a whole, behaves in 
ways analogous to a living organism. He seems to support the idea and, in fact, it could 
provide a way of justifying human obligations to protect and preserve species, ecosystems, 
and the biosphere. 
5.) There is the epistemological problem of attributing interests to nonsentient beings 
like trees. Goodpaster asserts that we are more than competent to appraise the needs of 
other nonsentient beings. He points out that we make decisions on behalf of others every 
day. 
6.) How does one live according to the principle of respect for life? What would we 
eat? How would we, could we, survive without utilizing other life-forms? Goodpaster 
defers this problem to moral significance for its resolution. He also distinguishes between 
regulative and operative moral consideration and acknowledges limits in operational moral 
consideration so we can eat. 
Discussion: 
Goodpaster's argument is good in that it extends the moral sphere to all life. 
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Unfortunately, he does not really address an operational strategy. His attempt to respond 
to the query about how we live under the principle of respect for life is to acknowledge 
that there are operational limits, but he does not discuss them. It is difficult to understand 
how, according to Goodpaster's principle of respect for life, one could take life for 
sustenance without violating the principle. 
Another weakness in Goodpaster's case is his failure to develop the issue of moral 
subject. Although he argues for moral considerability for all life, he does not go any 
deeper into the matter regarding the distinction between moral agent and moral subject. 
We do not know if he is arguing that all life-forms are moral subjects and that rational self-
legislative life-forms are moral agents or if the line of distinction falls somewhere else in 
the phylogenetic spectrum. Furthermore, he fails to develop the issue of moral subject for 
communities. 
Conclusion: Goodpastor raises important issues like the value of all life, however, his 
argument is weak and relatively ineffective. 
Paul Taylor: Biocentricity and the principle of respect. 
Taylor, like Goodpaster, argues for a biocentric moral system. Taylor offers four 
beliefs that form the fundamental tenets of a biocentric morality: 
(a) The belief that humans are members of the Earth's Community of Life in the 
same sense and on the same terms in which other living things are members of 
that Community. 
(b) The belief that the human species, along with all other species, are integral 
elements in a system of interdependence such that the survival of each living 
thing, as well as its chances of faring well or poorly, is determined not only by 
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the physical conditions of its environment but also by its relations to other 
living things. 
(c) The belief that all organisms are teleological centers oflife in the sense that 
each is a unique individual pursuing its own good in its own way. 
(d) The belief that humans are not inherently superior to other living things 
(Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 354). 
The third statement, (c) in the above tenets of a biocentric moral system, is the one 
most relevant to the issue of animal rights. It forms the premise from which Taylor derives 
a theory of value. He cites the advances made by the biological and physical sciences in 
the study of living organisms when he describes them as each "carrying out its life 
functions according to the laws of its species-specific nature" (Armstrong and Botzler 
1993, 354). Furthermore, research has also revealed the uniqueness of each individual 
organism. 
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Taylor defines ''teleological center of life" as an individual manifestation of life 
internal functioning as well as its external activities are all goal--oriented, having the 
constant tendency to maintain the organism's existence through time and to enable 
it successfully to perform those biological operations whereby it reproduces its 
kind and continually adapts to changing environmental events and conditions. It is 
the coherence and unity of these functions of an organism, all directed toward the 
realization of its good that make it one teleological center of activity (Armstrong 
and Botzler 1993, 355). 
Taylor argues that consciousness is not necessary for being a teleological center of life. 
"All organisms, whether conscious or not, are teleological centers of life in the sense that 
each is a unified, coherently-ordered system of goal-oriented activities that has a constant 
tendency to protect and maintain the organism's existence" (Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 
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355). Furthermore, each individual organism is different from any other including those of 
its own species. Every organism is unique. Taylor's theory of value or interests is that all 
life-forms have a good of their own. 
His theory of obligation is apparently based on the principle of respect: "right 
actions are always actions that express the attitude of respect ... " (Armstrong and Botzler 
1993, 357). This theory consists of four rules. The Rule ofNonmaleficence is the 
obligation not to harm any entity that has intrinsic value. The Rule of Noninterference is 
the obligation to not interfere with the freedom to pursue life-sustaining activities by 
organisms, or the natural homeostasis of ecosystems and biotic communities. The Rule of 
Fidelity is the obligation to treat organisms in such a manner as to engender their trust. 
The Rule of Restitutive Justice is the obligation "to restore the balance of justice between 
a moral agent and a moral subject when the subject has been wronged by the agent" 
(Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 358). 
Taylor also proposes five principles for resolving conflicts of interests. The 
principle of self-defense is the assertion that it is permissible for a moral agent to take 
whatever self-defensive action is necessary and sufficient to prevent injury or death 
resulting from the actions of another organism. The remaining four principles deal with 
instances of conflicts that involve the basic interests of nonhuman organisms and the 
nonbasic interests of humans. Nonbasic interests of humans, according to Taylor, are 
those interests that contribute or relate to the realization of some value system over and 
above what is necessary and sufficient for the maintenance of health and psychological 
well-being. Taylor divides human nonbasic needs into two types, those that are directly 
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exploitive of nature and are intrinsically incompatible with the respect principle and those 
that are not exploitive of nature but may inadvertently result in undesirable impacts that 
normally would be avoided. 
The principle of proportionality, as applied to conflicts of interests between human 
and nonhuman animals, requires that greater weight be given to basic needs than nonbasic 
ones, regardless of species. Non basic needs of humans are never sufficient to override the 
basic needs of nonhumans. The principle of minimum wrong requires that, in situations 
where the human actions will negatively impact the basic needs of nonhumans, the action 
which results in the least harm of any available alternative action is obligatory. The 
principle of distributive justice applies when the conflicts of interests involve the basic 
needs of both human and nonhuman animals. In this situation, both interests are of equal 
weight, and any resolution should distribute the resulting benefits and loses equally 
between the parties. Being human does not entitle one to greater consideration than that 
given nonhumans. The principle of restitutive justice is "applicable whenever the principles 
of minimum wrong and distributive justice have been followed" (Armstrong and Botzler 
1993, 366). It requires that whatever harm has been done to nonhuman individuals or 
communities be mitigated to an extent equal to the harm. 
Objections: 
1.) Some might object to Taylor's description of life activities as goal-oriented, which 
implies intent. How can a tree intend at all? Taylor seems to address this concern when he 
acknowledges that "trees and one-celled protozoa do not have a conscious life" 
60 
(Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 355). He points out that, in spite of the lack of 
consciousness, ''they have a good of their own around which their behavior is organized" 
(Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 355). This is an important point usually over-looked. 
Unconscious innate behaviors are clearly organized toward a goal or objective. Those 
goals are survival and reproduction. 
2.) Others might object that his teleological-center-of-life is defined in such a way 
that it could be extended to inanimate objects. Taylor has anticipated this objection and 
points out that inanimate objects cannot be centers-of-life nor can they have a point of 
view. A "stone has no good of its own" (Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 356). It is true that 
complex mechanisms can be teleological systems, however, "the goal oriented operations 
of machines are not inherent to them as the goal-oriented behavior of organisms is 
inherent to them" (Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 356). In other words, the goals of 
machines are derivative; the goals of organisms are original. 
3.) While Taylor argues convincingly, in my opinion, for his theory of value, his theory 
of obligation is not so clear. He asserts that all life-forms have a good oftheir own. This is 
usually taken to mean that they have intrinsic value and from this moral standing. This 
seems to be Taylor's position as well, however, he does not state it directly. He bases his 
theory of obligation on the respect principle, but does not develop it. He argues that 
humans cannot be morally superior to plants and animals, because one is a moral agent 
and the others are amoral, therefore, since plants and animals do not fall within the range 
of application of moral standards, it is meaningless to compare them. 
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Taylor does not use the term moral subject, although, one can infer that this is 
how he views plants and animals. His claims that all life-forms have a good of their own, 
that right actions express the attitude of respect, and his four rules of conduct clearly 
support this view. It would have strengthened Taylor's case to develop the issue of moral 
patient 
4.) Like Goodpaster, Taylor has a problem with predatory moral agents. We must 
prey on life to survive. Taylor maintains that his principle of distributive justice applies to 
this issue. Failure to prey on other life-forms would be to sacrifice human life so that 
nonhuman life of equal value could continue. Since humans and nonhumans are of equal 
value, according to the principle of distributive justice, it is morally permissible to kill 
animals for food. There is no obligation to give greater consideration to the interests of the 
nonhumans over the humans. The difficulty here is that Taylor seems to suggest that 
subsistence predation is permissible only where it is not possible to produce domestic prey 
and where "geographical conditions preclude dependence on plant life as a source of 
nutrition" (Armstrong and Botzler 1993, 365). What are we to infer from this? That in 
spite of his assertion that all forms of life are of equal value, plants have less value than 
domestic animals which have less value than wild animals? Taylor tries to justifY his 
position by appealing to his principle of minimum wrong. This is a perplexing principle 
which seems to permit wrong-doing as long as it is the least wrong of all available 
alternatives. The real difficulty here is the inherent implication that all predation by moral 
agents is wrong. Such a position is clearly absurd. Predation is a function of the species-
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specific nature of humans as well as many other species. Moral agency does not preclude 
or negate a biological imperative. 
Discussion: 
Taylor's concept of teleological centers of life is similar to Regan's subjectMof-aM 
life criterion for rights except that it is more inclusive. Instead of using subjective 
experience as the chosen characteristic, Taylor, like Goodpaster, argues that life itself is 
the appropriate value marker. Taylor's argument is stronger than Goodpaster's in that it 
asserts that continued existence and reproduction are ends and goods in themselves. It 
puts the value of life on firmer ground. He does, however, construct a strategy for the 
implementation of his biocentric moral system by offering rules and principles to facilitate 
moral decisions. His system will provide the foundation for the development of the 
biocentric moral system that follows. 
Cooclusioo: Although Taylor argues powerfully for a biocentric moral system, his 
operational strategy is not practical. 
Toward a Bioeeotrie, Moral System 
In order to minimize confusion and misunderstanding, a number of critical terms 
will be defined as used in the remainder of this paper. Although some of these terms are 
commonly used expressioos, there are often subtle differences in meaning. They are 
defined here for the purposes of clarity. Reportive definitions are taken from the 1989 
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edition ofWebster's Dictionary. When a definition is a modified version of the dictionary 
definition or a definition of a term not found in the dictionary, it will be noted as 
stipulative. 
biosphere--the part of a planet inhabited by living organisms. 
coefficient of relatedness--a quantitative measure of inclusive fitness which is the 
proportion of genes that are identical in two individuals because of common ancestors 
(Campbell 1993, 1184). 
conspecifics-individual organisms all belonging to the same species. 
culture--socially processed information; any species whose members make use of socially 
processed information has a culture that is describable in terms of that particular set of 
information. ( Q and I, 1992, XV) 
Darwinian fitness-a measure of the relative contribution of an individual to the gene 
pool ofthe next generation (Campbell1993, G-8). 
ecosphere-the portion of the universe sustaining life-that is Earth (stipulative). 
ecosystem--the interacting system of a biological community and its physical environment. 
ethics--a system of moral principles of behavior which govern an individual or group. 
inclusive fitness--the total effect an individual has on proliferating its genes by producing 
its own offspring and by providing aid that allows other close relatives to produce their 
offspring (Campbell1993,1184). 
interspecies ethics--a set of moral principles ofbehavior that govern individuals and 
groups of different species. ( stipulative) 
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intraspecies ethics--a set of moral principles of behavior that govern conspecifics. 
( stipulative) 
kin selection--individual altruism in the form of aid proportional to the coefficient of 
relatedness of relatives such that the individual wiD increase the likelihood that more genes 
identical to its own wiD be represented in the next generation. (Campbell 1993, 1184). 
life--the state of an organism characterized by certain processes or abilities that include 
metabolism, growth, reproduction, and response. 
morals--concerned with right or wrong and the distinction between them. 
moral systems--refers to a system of ethics or normative conduct. 
organism-a living being or entity adapted for living by means of organs that are separate 
in function but dependent on one another. 
species--A discrete band of individuals in the phylogenetic spectrum of life, closely related 
in structure and capable of interbreeding in nature to produce fertile offspring, but who 
cannot successfully interbreed with members of another species. The largest unit of 
population in which gene flow is possible and that is genetically isolated from other 
populations. 
Ethical or moral systems usually derive from worldviews based on religions, 
science, or tradition. This is not the place to argue worldviews, nor is it necessary. For the 
purpose of developing a biocentric moral system, the author wiD begin with several 
premises. One premise is that naturalism, a worldview offered by contemporary science, is 
the most coherent worldview consistent with a biocentric moral system. Another premise 
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is that the theory of evolution currently offers the best explanation for the origin of 
morality as well as species. This is a very controversial hypothesis because the idea of the 
evolution of morality is usually associated with the sociobiology theories ofE. 0. Wilson 
and others. These theories are under intense attack from philosophers who reject the 
hypothesis because it is suggestive of ethical or cultural relativism both of which have been 
refuted by modem philosophy. Evolutionary naturalism may provide a solution. 
Evolutionary (Ethical) Naturalism: 
Richard Drees makes the following claims for naturalism: 
1.) The natural world is the whole of reality that we know of and interact with; no 
supernatural realm distinct from the natural world shows up within our natural 
world, not even in the mental life of humans. 
2.) Our natural world is a unity in the sense that all entities are made up of the 
same constituents. 
3.) Physics offers us the best available description of these constituents, and thus of 
our natural world at its finest level of analysis. 
4.) The description and explanation of phenomena may require concepts which do 
not belong to the vocabulary of fundamental physics, especially if such 
phenomena involve complex arrangements of constituent particles or extensive 
interaction with a specific environment. 
5.) Fundamental physics and cosmology form a boundary of the natural sciences, 
where speculative questions with respect to a naturalist view of our world come 
most explicitly to the forefront. 
6.) Evolutionary biology offers the best available explanation for the emergence of 
various traits in organisms and ecosystems; such explanations focus on the 
contribution these traits have made to the inclusive fitness of organisms in 
which they were present. (Drees 1996, 12-20) 
These claims provide the foundation for a naturalistic worldview. According to 
naturalism, all phenomena are explainable by natural laws and processes which are 
consistent with empirical evidence. Therefore, according to naturalism, religious 
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traditions, morality, and moral systems are products of evolution explainable by natural 
laws and/or processes (Drees 1996, ). The sixth claim provides another premise in the 
search for a biocentric moral system. Evolutionary biology offers a cogent explanation for 
the development of morality as an emerging trait concomitant with intelligence and 
sociality in organisms. 
The Evolution of Morality: 
T. H. Huxley was one of the first, if not the first, to seriously suggest a connection 
between evolution and ethics in his Evolution and Ethics published in 1894. He wrote, "Of 
course, strictly speaking, social life, and the ethical process in virtue of which it advances 
towards perfection, are part and parcel of the general process of evolution" (Paradis and 
Wtlliams 1989, 172). In the succeeding century, Huxley's proposition has gained relatively 
few proponents. Scientific evidence did not really begin to catch up to Huxley's insight 
until the sixties when Hamilton realized that altruism between close relatives could help 
increase their genetic representation in the next generation (Campbell1993 , 1184). This 
led to the concept of inclusive fitness. 
Based on the latest scientific evidence, the theory of evolution offers the best 
explanation for the existence of moral phenomena. This is, however, a controversial 
position, given that the majority of the human species believe that morality derives from 
supernatural deities of one form or another. There is also the additional debate about 
evolution versus creationism that is often characterized as science versus religion. Stephen 
Jay Gould rejects this assertion and has proposed the principle of nonoverlapping 
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magisteria or NOMA, according to which, he claims that "no such conflict should exist 
because each subject has a legitimate magisteriurn, or domain of teaching authority--and 
these magisteria do not overlap" (Gould 1997, 18). While that may be true in regards to 
the evolution versus creation debate, it does not hold regarding morality, which Gould 
considers the "exclusive domain of religion" (Gould 1997, 18). In any case, religious 
world views are beyond the purview of this paper and will not be addressed in any way. 
It is not possible in this thesis to give a complete account of the argument for the 
evolution of morality or present even a significant amount of the evidence in support of 
that argument. The most thorough account of the question of moral evolution is presented 
by Richard Alexander in The Biology of Moral Systems ( 1987). The volume and depth of 
the evidence he presents in support of his argument are remarkable. He is perhaps the 
most cited author by those scientists and philosophers who are working in the field of 
evolutionary ethics. For the purposes of this thesis, only the fundamental premises of 
Alexander's argument will be presented. Hopefully they will be sufficient to demonstrate 
the merits of the case for moral evolution, the importance of which is critical for a natural 
worldview that rejects any appeal to the supernatural for explanations of natural 
phenomena. Moreover, if morality is a product of evolution, human and nonhuman are 
bound not only by biological evolution, but by moral evolution as well. One must keep in 
mind that virtually all the work that has been done on moral evolution deals with humans. 
Few in the animal rights debate have taken modem evolutionary theory into account. 
Rachels refers to it to support his moral individualism, and Singer makes reference to 
reciprocity. However, Alexander faults him for his very narrow view of it, which ignores 
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the concept of indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1987, 157). In spite of this handicap, it will 
be obvious that the argument and evidence for moral evolution apply to one degree or 
another across the phylogenetic spectrum. 
The issue of morality or ethics is essentially a matter of behavior. Behavior can be 
viewed as a continuum beginning on one end with the simplest genetically coded behavior 
or deterministic stimulus/response of a bacteria to the most complex social behavior of 
rational, self-legislative, moral agents like human animals. According to Donald Griffin of 
Princeton University, cognitive ability arose "through the normal process of natural 
- . -
selection, and, like many other major animal functions, forms a phylogenetic continuum 
that extends back in evolutionary history" (Campbell1993, 1186). In other words, there is 
no distinct line in the continuum of behavior dividing rational from nonrational behaviors. 
Given Griffin's claim, it is reasonable to assert that morality arose in the same manner and 
that it, too, "forms a phylogenetic continuum that extends back through evolutionary 
history" (Campbell199, 1186). 
Accordins. to evolutionary theory, behaviors, both innate and learned, are strongly 
influenced by genes. If there were no genetic influence, behavior would not be subject to 
natural selection and could not evolve (Campbell1993, 1159). Behavior is a consequence 
of genetic and environmental influences. All organisms, therefore, can be expected to 
behave in ways that optimize their Darwinian fitness within an environmental context. 
Behavioral ecology is "based on the expectation that animals increase their Darwinian 
fitness by optimal behavior" (Campbell1993, 1159). Behaviors that increase reproductive 
success survive, those that do not, do not survive. Those mechanisms that underlie a 
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particular behavior and can include the environmental stimulus, if any, that trigger a 
behavior, are referred to as proximate causes. The reason that a particular behavior exists 
is referred to as its ultimate cause. 
All living organisms, including humans, have innate genetically coded behaviors 
such as fixed-action pattern (F AP) behaviors. F AP behaviors have evolved as responses to 
specific stimuli. One of the most powerful ofFAP behaviors is the "fight or flee" response 
to a threat stimulus that was discussed earlier in this paper. The power of this F AP is, 
undoubtedly, an indication of its value in terms ofDarwinian fitness because reproduction 
is fundamentally dependent on survival at least to sexual maturity. Other behaviors are 
learned, which is basically the process by which behaviors are modified by experience. 
Learned behaviors are gene dependent, in as much as the neural physiology that makes 
learning possible is, to a large extent, genetically determined. 
Behavior can be asocial with each individual living a life independent of contact 
with conspecifics except for reproduction. Bears, badgers, foxes, pumas, and so on are 
typically asocial organisms. Behavior can also be social in that individuals can increase 
their Darwinian fitness by cooperative effort that is more efficient than individual effort. 
There are a number oftypes of social behavior. Perhaps the simplest is aggregation of 
individuals into herds, schools, and flocks in which the principal benefit is the protection 
from predation afforded by the relative anonymity in a group. Social behavior gradually 
increases in complexity from aggregative through agonistic and dominance hierarchies to 
the complex moral society of humans. Agonistic behavior, or ritual combat, has evolved as 
a means of establishing dominance with a minimum of injury and a reduction in the number 
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of conflicts (Campbell 1993, 1176). Dominance hierarchies can be said to be codes of 
behavior based on dominance and submission, in other words a "pecking order", which to 
a certain extent regulate the behaviors of individuals in the society. Moral societes are 
societies that have developed rational rules of acceptable behavior. These are species-
specific behaviors organized to maximize Darwinian fitness through confluence of 
interests. As social complexity increases, social behaviors become more complex and 
codified. Individual drives among a social species in a common niche inevitably increase 
conflict because of the increasing competition for a limited resource. Codification of social 
behaviors is an adaptive mechanism for minimizing conflicts within a society. 
In a wolf pack, the dominance hierarchy is a code of behavior that assures the next 
generation of the pack will be the best in terms of inclusive fitness that the pack can 
produce. Dominance is important not only as a mechanism for the reduction of conflict but 
also to improve the survival potential of the pack progeny in times of limited resources. In 
such a situation, the alpha female will prevent other females from reproducing. All the 
pack's resources are focused on one litter of pups. This necessitates that the reproductive 
drives of the rest of the pack members not be fulfilled. They must be subordinate to the 
needs of the pack, but this does not mean that they cease to function, although there is 
evidence that the drive becomes depressed. Still, there is a conflict between the 
individual's needs to reproduce and the fitness strategy that only the strongest reproduce 
to maximize the potential for survival of the offspring thereby ensuring the survival of the 
pack. It is this tension between individual needs and the needs of the society in terms of 
Darwinian 
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fitness and natural selection that "selected for'' optimal codes of behavior. It is reasonable 
to assert that, as the adaptive trait of intelligence or rationality evolved in a social context, 
the codification of social behaviors would have gradually evolved into codes of reasoned 
and moral behavior. As societies of rational organisms became more complex, so did the 
moral codes necessary to minimize conflicts of interests. 
The complexity of the behavioral repertoire of a species is proportional to the 
physiological complexity of the organism, the degree of interaction with conspecifics, and 
the richness of its habitat. Taylor provides us with the basis for defining a behavioral 
repertoire as a unified, coherently ordered system of goal-oriented activities that has a 
constant tendency to protect and maintain an organism's existence for the purpose of 
fulfilling its ultimate cause which is reproduction. 
Alexander asserts that "moral systems are societies with rules. Rules are 
agreements or understandings about what is permitted and what is not, about what 
rewards and punishments are likely for specific acts, about what is right and wrong" 
(Alexander 1987, 1). Morality exists because of the conflicts and confluences of interests 
inherent in societies. By mitigating the negative social impacts of conflicts of interests, it 
increases reproductive success. Social behavior entails conflicts and confluences of 
interests which entail morality and capability (ought implies can). Obviously not all social 
behaviors are moral. Morality is an issue when, in an interaction between individuals, at 
least one of which must be a moral agent, there is the possibility of one gaining an 
advantage over the other. Rational behavior such as deciding to take a stroll is amoral. 
However, agreeing to abide by the social code that prohibits having sex with my neighbors 
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mate, thereby overriding the natural interests of my genes to reproduce, is clearly moral. 
This moral rule ostensibly benefits society by reducing competition for a mate which, in 
tum, reduces social stress, theoretically increasing the overall reproduction potential of all 
the members of the society. 
Kin selection is an important concept in the evolution of morality. Without it the 
process of natural selection would have resulted in behaviors that maximized an 
individual's reproductive success regardless of the damage resulting to other individuals, 
groups, or species. In nature, however, we occasionally see incidents of altruistic or 
unselfish behavior. In meerkat colonies, for example, individuals take turns as a sentry 
watching for predators. When one is sighted, the sentry lets out a series of shrill whistle's 
that warns the rest of the community that danger is near. This behavior clearly puts the 
sentry at greater risk than the other members of the community due to its obvious alarm 
behavior that draws the attention of the predator to itself rather than the others. 
Hamilton was the first to realize that "selection could result in animals increasing 
their genetic representation in the next generation by 'altruistically' helping close relatives 
other than their own offspring" (Campbell1993, 1184). This realization led to the idea of 
inclusive fitness which is quantified by calculating the coefficient of relatedness between 
individuals. An individual's altruistic behavior may "result in more genes identical to its 
own in the next generation if it aids a sibling rather than a cousin" (Campbell 1993, 1184). 
This mechanism is referred to as kin selection. Yet, some animals also behave altruistically 
to nonrelatives. This behavior is not common in animals, and is usually seen only in those 
species with social groups that are stable enough to permit exchange of aid. The exchange 
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of aid between animals is referred to as reciprocal altruism (Campbell1993, 1185). 
Alexander refers to reciprocal altruism as indirect reciprocity and asserts that moral 
systems are systems of indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1987, 77). The concepts of kin 
selection, inclusive fitness, altruism, and reciprocal altruism form an integral component of 
the sociobiological thesis that social behavior has an evolutionary basis. Michael Ruse 
reaffirms the importance of sociobiology when he states that "this theory of 'kin 
selection', and related models, spurred massive interest in the evolution of social 
behavior ... and with such interest came one overwhelming conclusion ... co-operation is 
virtually the norm in the animal world rather than the exception" (Ruse 1995, 235). 
The central hypothesis of evolutionary biology is that happiness (pleasure) and its 
anticipation (desire) are the proximate mechanisms that lead us to perform and repeat acts 
that, in the environments of history, at least, would have led to greater reproductive 
success (Alexander 1987, 26). Furthermore, access or control of resources is vital to 
reproductive success. Alexander asserts that "to establish principles is reduction or 
simplification" (Alexander 1987, 14). In evolutionary biology, the search is for the 
principles that have given rise to "traits and tendencies, or at least the potentials for them" 
(Alexander 1987, 14). Thus, evolutionary reductionism is the development of principles 
from the evolutionary process. Alexander refers to Feinberg's assertion that pleasure and 
happiness are the best candidates for the status of supreme goods or ultimate goals. 
Moreover, according to Feinberg, finding "one large genus" by which we can analyze 
proximate mechanisms in relation to our behaviors will be very difficult. Alexander asserts 
that "discovering that our history of evolution by natural selection has been one of tuning 
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'enjoyment idioms' (proximate mechanisms) in the service of survival of genetic materials 
via reproductive success is precisely what evolutionary reductionism has accomplished" 
(Alexander 1996, 19). 
Because moral and ethical problems and questions exist solely because of conflicts 
of interests, a theory of interests (valuation) is required. Alexander adopts Roscoe 
Pound's definition of interest "as a demand or desire which humans either individually or 
in groups or in associations or in relations, seek to satisfy, of which, therefore, the 
ordering of human relations must take account. Conflicts between interests arise from 
competition between individuals, groups or societies seeking to satisfy their wants" 
(Alexander 1987, 33). This definition, obviously, can be applied to all life-forms, not just 
human. 
Based on this definition of interests, Alexander equates a theory of interests 
(values) with a theory of lifetimes: "lifetimes have evolved so as to promote survival of 
genetic materials, through individuals producing and aiding offspring and, in some species, 
aiding other descendants and some nondescendant relatives as well" (Alexander 1987,37). 
A theory of lifetimes is also a theory of effort. Lifetimes are composed of effort divided 
into two types--somatic and reproductive. Accordingly, the ultimate cause (goal) of life is 
not survival, but to maximize the likelihood of survival of their genes by reproduction. 
Recognizing that reproduction is the ultimate cause of valuation (interests) provides us 
with the means for understanding conflicts of interest. Survival of the soma and growth, 
development, learning, and cooperation are proximate mechanisms of reproductive 
success which is a proximate mechanism of genic survival (Alexander 1987, 38). 
15 
There is no reason to demand that interests refer only to what organisms 
consciously believe are their interests or intentions; all organisms are evolved to serve the 
interests of their genes, however, this does not necessarily imply that rational beings are 
obliged to serve them. Evolution is most deterministic for those organisms that are 
unaware of it. Alexander observes "that if this argument is correct, it may be the first to 
carry us from is to ought' thereby resolving the naturalistic fallacy that has for so long 
plagued naturalistic philosophers. In other words, "if we desire to be the conscious 
masters of our own fates, and if conscious effort in that direction is the most likely vehicle 
of survival and happiness, then we ought to study evolution (Alexander 1987, 40). The 
naturalistic fallacy is the claim that there is, as Hume put it, "a logical difference between 
claims about matters of fact ('is' statements) and claims about morality 
('ought' statements)" (Ruse 1995, 229). 
To summarize, one can argue that rationality, sociality, and morality are the 
products of evolution. Nitecki states: 
To an evolutionary ethicist no organism exists alone; two or more organisms 
together generate a relationship, which when beneficial to the two (or to the 
group) is "good," and when disruptive is "bad"; the boundaries between conscious 
and unconscious behavior are very hazy, or at least not clearly delineated; humans 
are not subject to any biological or physical law not applicable to other organisms, 
and all humans obey all biological and physical laws; no human society exists 
without a system of ethics, which is an internal societal system of control; and, 
therefore, all human behavior can be reduced to biology (Nitecki and Nitecki 1993, 
7) 
Those who believe that culture has somehow liberated us from our history of 
natural selection will be skeptical. (Alexander 1987, 21). If we assume that all life-forms, 
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including h~ are the product of evolution, then it is reasonable to reject any assertion 
that humans are unique and outside the biological laws of behavior. From Alexander's 
theory of interests one can conclude that life has inherent value and, furthermore, that 
reproduction as the ultimate cause of life has inherent value as well. At this point we have 
a theory of value as described by Taylor and supported by evolutionary naturalism. 
Objections: 
Although there are, undoubtedly, many objections to the hypothesis of moral 
evolution, the three most prominent ones will be discussed here. 
I.) The first objection is that proximate and ultimate mechanisms are of the same kind 
of significance and can be combined as if they were in the same class of causes. Alexander 
responds that this "is a failure to understand that proximate causes are evolved because of 
ultimate causes, and therefore may be expected to serve them, while the reverse is not 
true" (Alexander 1987, 161). He contends that pleasure is a proximate mechanism that 
drives us to behaviors that will contribute to our reproductive success. However, 
behaviors that contribute to our reproductive success are not proximate mechanisms that 
evolved to drive us toward maximizing pleasure. 
2.) Another objection is that morality inevitably involved self-sacrifice, which is 
counter to the evolutionary imperative. Alexander asserts that this objection is based on 
three errors: "a.) failure to consider altruism as benefits to the actor; b.) failure to 
comprehend all avenues of indirect reciprocity within groups; and c.) failure to take into 
account both within-group and between-group benefits" (Alexander 1987, 161). 
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3.) Another objection is the naturalistic fallacy that is described on page 73. Other 
than his statement noted above on page 72-73, Alexander does not give a good response 
to this objection, however the typical argument is basically that if morality is the product 
of evolution, it has an empirical base from which we can deduce certain facts. From these 
facts we can, by applying reason, deduce how one ought to behave. 
Moral Obligations: 
Animal rights have evolved from the hypothesis that the criteria for moral standing 
are too limited. Over the course of human evolutionary history, the sphere of moral 
considerability has been expanded to encompass all moral agents as well as those moral 
subjects who would normally or potentially be a moral agent but for some mitigating 
factor such as infancy or senility. The animal rights theorists seek to expand the moral 
sphere and the arguments presented in Part One above reflect their attempts. All of their 
theories seem inadequate to the task in one way or another. These arguments are monistic 
in that they seek "to produce, and to defend against all rivals, a single coherent and 
complete set of principles capable of governing all moral quandaries" (Stone 1987, 116). 
Moral quandaries" ... exist solely because of conflicts of interest; moral systems 
exist because confluences of interest at lower levels of social organization are used to deal 
with conflicts of interest at higher levels" (Alexander 987, 33). Stone classifies moral 
quandaries into conflicts between natural persons, corporations, nation-states, and 
animals. (Stone 1987, 37-38). For our purposes we will take "human" to refer to: 
corporations, nation-states, tribes, clans, and so on as communities of moral agents; plants 
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and animals as amoral organisms capable of being moral subjects; and schools, packs, 
herds, troops, flocks, hives, and so on as communities of amoral organisms capable of 
being moral subjects. Conflicts of interests can arise within and between any of these 
classes. 
All intraspecies conflicts are resolved according to the species-specific codes of 
behavior consistent with the natures of the particular species involved. Intraspecies codes 
of behavior may be either amoral or moral and are applicable only to intraspecies 
conflicts. Human moral codes of behavior are applicable only to humans, just as the code 
ofbehavior of wolves is applicable only to wolves, and so forth. No species, including 
human, has the right or obligation to impose its code ofbehavior on any other species. In 
the mid-seventies, a visitor to the Toledo Zoo remained in the zoo after closing and 
sometime during the night removed his clothes and entered the polar bear exhibit. Polar 
bears are fierce predators and, as any zoo keeper can tell you~ to enter their exhibit is to 
effectively commit suicide. The individual was found the next morning by zoo keepers. He 
was dead, and more than half his body had been consumed. When the story broke in the 
local news media, there were cries from some citizens that the polar bears should be 
executed. This incident illustrates the increasing lack ofhuman understanding of and 
alienation from nature. The polar bears committed no crime, violated no applicable moral 
code, therefore, on what grounds were they to be condemned? Incidents like this occur 
frequently, although the animals involved are usually dogs protecting their territory (yard). 
Humans even go so far as to put animals on trial in courts, as though their moral and legal 
codes ofbehavior are applicable to nonhuman organisms (Stone 1987, 63-64). 
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lnterspecies codes of behavior are more complex. For the vast majority of species, 
interspecies conflicts are amoral. That is, there is no question of right or wrong. The 
resolution of such interspecies conflicts is determined by the nature of the conflict and the 
species-specific codes of behavior characteristic of the individuals involved in the conflict. 
lnterspecies conflicts typically derive from competition for a resource including food, 
water, shelter, or territory. These types ofinterspecies conflicts are nearly always resolved 
by agonistic or dominance behavior resulting in little or no injury, which, in nature, often 
leads to death. 
Another type of interspecies conflict is that between predator and prey. This type 
of conflict is obviously a matter of survival for both participants. Heterotrophic species 
must consume other life-fonns to survive. These conflicts are also resolved according to 
the species-specific, interspecies codes ofbehavior of the individuals involved in the 
conflict. Lions, according to the nature of their interspecies code of behavior, resolve 
conflicts, either with other predators or potential prey, with tooth and claw, whereas, 
zebras according to their interspecies code of behavior, resolve conflicts with predators by 
fleeing. These are obviously oversimplified examples to make a point. All species have 
both intraspecies and interspecies codes ofbehavior characteristic of the nature of their 
species. When interspecies conflicts involve a rational moral agent, the conflict can 
become an issue of morality. 
Based on current scientific thought, only members of one species, Homo sapien, 
fulfill the criteria for moral agents and moral communities. Conflicts between moral agents 
and/or moral communities are, therefore, intraspecies conflicts, and their resolution would 
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derive from an intraspecies moral and/or legal system. In an interspecies conflict with a 
moral agent, the moral standing of the other party is critical to its resolution. 
In a biocentric moral system of the type under discussion here, the criterion for 
moral standing is Taylor's teleological-center-of-a-life from which it follows that all life-
forms have a good of their own (intrinsic value). From the respect principle, all moral 
agents have an obligation to treat those individuals who have intrinsic value in ways that 
respect their intrinsic value. Having intrinsic value is usually taken to mean that the 
individual has rights. This is similar to Regan's argument for animal rights except that 
subject-of-a-life is replaced by Taylor's much more comprehensive teleological-center-of-
a-life, and rights can be either the rights of a moral agent or patient depending on the 
individual. That is, the individual has a right and is permitted to pursue the goal(s) around 
which its internal functions and external behaviors are organized, which are continued 
survival and reproduction. Therefore, it can be asserted that all life-forms have rights. 
What type of rights an organism has depends on whether the individual organism has the 
capacities necessary to comprehend issues of morality and accept moral obligations. These 
are usually defined as rationality and self-agency. Rational, self-legislative, moral agents 
can have and generate obligations, while nonrational moral patients can only generate 
moral obligations in moral agents. Since, according to the teleological-center-of-a-life 
criterion, all life-forms have intrinsic value, all life-forms have moral standing. This does 
not mean, however, that in the case of a conflict between two moral patients that moral 
standing is relevant. Since neither is a moral agent, they cannot have obligations to each 
other, therefore, their moral standing is irrelevant. As soon as a conflict of interest 
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involves a moral agent, all parties to the conflict have moral standing, although, only the 
moral agent has any obligations. This obviously does not apply to the ant a human steps 
on while walking to the store because there is no conflict of interest in the usual sense. 
However, it would apply to any intentional human action that impacts individuals, groups, 
or natural systems such as draining a wetland or clearing a forest. 
When any individual organism becomes involved in a conflict of interest with 
another organism or group of organisms, it is permitted to exercise and defend its rights 
according to its species-specific code of behavior regardless of the relative morality of that 
code of behavior. In the example given above of the conflict between a group of polar 
bears and a human, each party had a right to exercise and defend their interests. The polar 
bears had a right to defend their territory and to kill and consume prey that just happened 
to be human. The human had a right to defend its life. The fact that one was a moral agent 
and the others moral patients was irrelevant. Both behaved according to their species-
specific codes of behavior. This is simply a conflict of interests between predator and prey; 
morality is not an issue. The fact that Peter Singer and other animal rights advocates assert 
or imply that predation is immoral is evidence of how an industrial-technological culture 
tends to alienate and isolate humans from nature. 
In conflicts of interests between humans and nonhumans where the human is the 
predator rather than the prey, morality becomes an issue to the extent that the moral agent 
has an obligation to minimize the suffering of its prey which is a moral patient by virtue of 
its conflict of interest with a moral agent. In conflicts of interests between humans and 
nonhumans that are competitive rather than predatory, the moral agent has a moral 
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obligation to give equal consideration to the interests of the moral subject. What does this 
mean in practical terms? Humans cannot eat because it would end a life? 
Humans are not separate from nature, they are an integral part of it. We are 
heterotrophic organisms that must consume life to exercise our right to survive and 
reproduce, but we have an obligation to give equal consideration to the interests of other 
life-forms. Equal consideration, not greater. In a conflict of interest between a human and 
a bison that involves survival, the human is a predator. The only moral issue is the 
question of the suffering of the bison, in this case, a moral patient, which the human has an 
obligation to minimize. Predation is not a moral issue even for moral agents except in the 
context of how the predation is carried out. Furthermore, picking up a package of ground 
beef in the supermarket is still predation, albeit by proxy. The consumer still has a moral 
obligation to the animal from which the beef was obtained. Predation is the killing and 
consumption of members of another species. To a plant, a cow is a predator. 
In regards to those individual life-forms that we hold captive in zoos, research 
facilities, in our homes as pets or companions, or any other situation where the life-form, 
whether plant or animal is dependent on human care, humans have moral obligations to 
respect and provide for the physical, psychological, emotional, and behavioral needs of the 
individual organism. Furthermore, as these activities occur within a society of moral 
agents, the human keepers should be held accountable by that society's code of conduct 
(for the most part, a formal legal institution) for the treatment of any and all organisms for 
which they have assumed responsibility. 
Some animal rights proponents would object that any of these activities violate the 
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individual organism's rights. However, one can argue that predation need not be limited to 
consumption, but could include other activities including the keeping of pets and livestock. 
This is a complex issue that raises many difficult questions that cannot be properly 
addressed in this thesis. For example, is the use of animals in medical research for the 
benefit of humans consumption (predation) or exploitation? Neither provides any benefit 
to the prey, however, consumption at least can assure the prey of some minimum quality 
of life followed by a relatively painless death. Medical research, by its nature, inflicts pain 
and suffering on a living organism that does not have the opportunity to refuse. Some 
would argue that only humans should be used in medical research that benefits primarily, if 
not exclusively, humans. 
If all life-forms have intrinsic value, it follows that their communities have extrinsic 
value. A community of moral agents is a moral community. A community of moral 
patients is a moral community only when it is impacted by humans. In fact, as has been 
argued above, the evolution of communities or societies was a proximate cause of the 
evolution of morality. Biological organisms evolve in specific communities, habitats, and 
ecosystems and generally are not able to survive or thrive outside of these. Living 
organisms cannot exist in a vacuum; they exist in specific habitats or ecosystems. Habitats 
and ecosystems are communities of living organisms integrated into a particular physical 
environment such that the biotic and abiotic components together fonn an organized, 
coherent community. Habitats and ecosystems have extrinsic value to the life-forms 
inhabiting them. Furthennore, moral agents, when contemplating any action that may 
impact a biological community, habitat, or ecosystem, have moral obligations to all the 
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life-fonns involved. If an exotic organism invades a biological community without any 
human involvement in its introduction, humans have no moral obligation to interfere, in 
fact they may have an obligation not to interfere. U: however, the exotic organism invades 
as a result of some human action, the resulting conflict of interests become a matter of 
morality. The moral agents have an obligation to both the exotic organism and the invaded 
community. Moral resolution of the problem must follow a set of priorities. If removal of 
the introduced organism is practical, it ought to be done as soon as possible in ways that 
equally respect the interests of both the exotic and indigenous life-fonns, along with 
whatever management of the habitat is necessary to restore it to homeostasis. If removal is 
not practical, then management techniques that minimize the impact of the exotic invader 
must be initiated and maintained as long as the invader is a threat to the homeostasis of the 
community. 
In those instances where conflicts of interests arise between humans and 
nonhumans over a commonly used resource, Taylor's principle of proportionality may 
provide a mechanism for resolution. In any situation where there is a conflict between the 
basic needs of nonhuman organisms and nonbasic needs of humans, greater weight is 
given to the basic needs of the nonhuman organisms. 
The ecosphere is, in a practical sense, the global biological community (biosphere) 
interacting with the physical environment (geosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere). 
Because they have a biological component comprised oflife-fonns all of whom have moral 
standing. ecosystems such as a lake, river, or forest are moral communities in which both 
individuals and groups compete for vital resources. The health of a species or an 
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ecosystem is a matter of morality, if, and only if, that health is in any way threatened by 
either an individual--or community level--moral agent. If a species is endangered by the 
actions of moral agents, then the moral agents have obligations to restore the species to its 
previous condition. 
Homeostasis in an ecosystem can be defined as that state which obtains when the 
interests of all the life-forms in the ecosystem are given equal weight. If homeostasis is 
disrupted by a moral agent, the moral agents have a moral obligation to restore it. In other 
words, moral agents have an obligation to preserve the homeostasis of any ecosystem they 
interact with. Because of the unparalleled evolutionary success of rationality, humankind 
effectively has control of the entire ecosphere. Therefore, it can be argued that humans 
have moral obligations to maintain an equal balance between those resources that are 
committed to human use and those that are committed to nonhuman use. Humans are not 
entitled to any greater share of nature's resources than any other life-form. 
Summary: 
In Part II of this paper, I have focused on only one type of moral system. There are 
obviously many other moral systems that derive from scientific disciplines as well as 
religious and cultural traditions. This narrow focus should not be construed as a judgment 
for or against any one system. It was simply not possible in this paper to address all the 
other possibilities. Ethical Naturalism was selected because it is particularly amenable to 
logical analysis as well as its unique applicability to natural resource issues. This thesis 
represents only the first stage in the development and evaluation of a biocentric approach 
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to the whole issue of morality. 
Although there are, undoubtedly, many objections that could be raised to the 
forgoing discussion of a biocentric approach to animal rights, the intention of this 
discussion was simply to present a number of propositions relevant to a biocentric view of 
animal rights. It seems evident that the difficulty with each of the current theories about 
interspecies ethics is that they are trying to apply an intraspecies ethic in an interspecies 
context. From all the evidence so far, I think this is not only futile, but also inappropriate. 
It is the result of the difficulty we have in removing our anthropocentric glasses. Perhaps a 
more accurate description would be that the highly refined lenses of ratiocination through 
which most humans view the world have caused most of them to have such a myopic view 
of nature that they view themselves as outside and above nature. It is this delusion that, in 
my opinion, is the greatest threat to the survival of our materialistic culture and the 
environmental balance. It is doubtful that we will find a satisfactory system of moral 
standing until we can restore ourselves to our rightful place as a participant in nature 
rather that just an observer or consumer. This will be difficult to achieve because there will 
be so much resistance to overcome that has been built into our culture--a culture that has 
been essentially founded on the assertion that man is the product of a supernatural creation 
and therefore is not part of nature. Everything which is natural in us, we have been 
encouraged to distrust. The reality is that we are of nature and we ought to release the 
"beast" inside us to get back in touch with it. 
It would be of great help in our quest for an interspecies ethic if we could 
transcend our rationality to the extent that we have control of it, rather than the other way 
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round. We are an autonomous, self-legislative, rational naked ape. We have inside of us all 
the feelings, instincts and drives that the other apes have. 
A Bioeentric., Intenpeeies Ethie. 
Worldview: 
Premise 1. If any worldview is consistent with the description of the natural world 
provided by both the natural sciences and human intuition in a simple 
and coherent way, then that worldview is correct. 
Premise 2. Evolutionary naturalism is a worldview that is consistent with the 
description of the natural world provided by both the natural sciences 
and human intuition. 
Conclusion: The worldview of evolutionary naturalism is correct. 
Ethical theory: 
Premise 1. We are to treat those individuals who have intrinsic value in ways that 
respect their intrinsic value. (respect principle) 
Premise 2. To be the teleological-center-of-a-life is to have intrinsic value 
Conclusion: Teleological-centers-of-a-life are to be treated in ways that respect 
their intrinsic value. 
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